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INTRODUCTION
Much happened in late eighteenth-century American
legal history: an era that produced the Constitution,
Declaration of Independence, and Bill of Rights. Yet we
may still underestimate the legal creativity of this era. The
same people who drafted the Constitution also designed our
other great form of collective governance: the business
corporation. The two great corporate issues of today-the
problems of internal corporate governance and the fear of
corporate power-originated in one brief decade: 1781-91.
These issues were not embryonic: they emerged full-grown,
and were at the center of debate. Eighteenth-century
corporate governance was a complex and purposive
response to the separation of ownership and control, as
fully sophisticated as the Constitution. The eighteenth
century attack on the democratic legitimacy of private
economic power was as sophisticated as anything seen
since, and remains cogent today.
When I began this work, I did not suspect that I would
be dealing with corporate governance. I thought that fear of
concentrated corporate power would be a peripheral
concern. My initial goal was very limited: to discover why
Alexander Hamilton inserted a clause into the charter of
the First Bank of the United States that limited the Bank's
power to engage in commercial transactions. I did not
realize until later that I had seized on a golden thread.
Banks were the major business corporations of the time,
and the forces that separated banking from commerce were
the forces that created early American corporate law. These
forces remain regnant today: the separation of ownership
and control, and fear of corporate power.
The events of the late eighteenth century also contain a
possible answer to a difficult problem: why the corporation?
The late eighteenth century may have needed business
organizations that could agglomerate large amounts of
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capital from unrelated individuals. However, the
corporation was not the only eighteenth-century legal
means to this end, and the business corporation was
virtually untested in colonial America. Did the business
corporation have any advantages over its competitors, such
as the joint-stock company or limited partnership? The
obvious answer-limited liability-was probably not
decisive, and may not even have been all that useful.
England-a far more advanced commercial country than
the United States-did not commonly employ limited
liability (or the corporate form) until the middle of the
nineteenth century.
I argue that the eighteenth-century business
community preferred corporate governance in business
affairs for the same reason it preferred Constitutional
governance in political affairs: members needed to limit
their creature's own power. The late eighteenth-century
corporate charter provided unique protection against
expropriation by majority stockholders, protection that
other forms of organization could not supply. The
eighteenth-century business community needed a charter
from the State that could not be modified except by a costly
and unpredictable political process. Such a charter would
provide credible commitments against improper behavior by
majority shareholders. As an added bonus, charter
restrictions provided political cover. At critical times and in
critical ways, the restrictions on these charters protected
the incorporators from a polity that was deeply skeptical
about the business corporation. Although the governance
need for a corporate charter diminished in the early
nineteenth century, Americans had become accustomed to
the corporate form, which proved supple enough to meet
subsequent business needs.
I organize my discussion with two stories: one of
corporate governance and one of corporate politics. I tell
these stories in two different ways. Corporate governance,
like the business corporation itself, is instrumental, and
calls for a functional exposition. Part I discusses the
structure, function, and governance of one kind of
corporation-the eighteenth-century mercantile bank. The
first mercantile bank was the Bank of North America
("BNA"), chartered in 1781. The BNA and its daughter
banks carefully accommodated corporate governance
concerns, in both their corporation law and their internal
1013
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operations. Indeed, the very corporate existence of these
banks seems best explained by governance.
My story of corporate politics is not instrumental. Part
II therefore tells this story chronologically. I use three bank
wars to organize this story. The greatest of these wars was
the first: the charter loss and subsequent rechartering of
the BNA in 1785-1787. A smaller war was fought in the
1791 creation of the Bank of the United States ("BUS").
However, Alexander Hamilton had learned the political
lessons of the BNA, and preempted as many objections as
he could.' A third war was fought in 1792, with the charter
revisions of the Massachusetts Bank. Fear of business
corporations played an important part in all these wars, but
was only well articulated in the first.
These two stories overlap and reinforce each other. The
governance problems of the early banks created political
problems. Hamilton's famous Report on a National Bank2
was a masterly political document in part because it was an
excellent treatise on corporate governance. Although I
separate these two stories for expositional convenience,
early corporate governance and early corporate politics
were very closely entwined.
I. CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNANCE
Before discussing the history of eighteenth-century
banking corporations and their governance, I begin with a
brief discussion of the prehistory of banks.
A. The Prehistory of Chartered Banks
The history of American banking existed before the
American Revolution. However, Colonial business
corporations were at best vestigial, and Colonial banks were
not business corporations. Most large-scale transactions
were conducted on the books of English export houses, and
the colonies developed no great merchant banks. Colonial
merchants also conducted financial operations, albeit
1. See infra text accompanying notes 310-25.
2. Alexander Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, in LEGISLATIVE AND
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES at 15, 21 (M.
St.Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall eds., Augustus M. Kelley, 1967) (1832) [hereinafter
HISTORY OF TE BUS].
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seldom on the scale of English merchant houses. These
merchant houses-organized as partnerships or
proprietorships-were not standalone banks, as we would
understand the term today.3 They accepted deposits,
extended commercial credit, and themselves were active in
trade.4  Most colonial banking was an extension of
mercantile activities, and not a very significant extension,
at that. But there was one exception.
Although the need for trade credit may have been
satisfied by English and domestic merchant banks, the need
for currency was not. The colonies were specie-poor, and
remained so for many years after independence. An adjunct
to specie was sorely needed.5 The adjunct currency was
often supplied by colonial loan offices, which were the only
formal domestic stand-alone banking institutions of this
period.6 These government agencies, frequently organized
as public corporations, issued paper currency backed by
land mortgages.7 They helped inculcate the colonists with a
love of paper money, and also played an important role in
the political debates of the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century. Some colonies, such as Pennsylvania
and Maryland, managed to keep their paper currency at par
with specie.8 Other colonies, such as Rhode Island, chose an
expansive monetary policy, and issued depreciating scrip.
Loan offices were restricted by the federal Constitution
(which forbade direct emission of State currency°), and did
not leave significant institutional descendants.
But the Colonial era did not produce a specialized
mercantile bank, whether chartered or unchartered."
3. See 2 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 3-5, 34 (Russell & Russell 1965) (1917).
4. ROBERT A. EAST, BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN THE AMiERICAN REVOLUTIONARY
ERA 20-26 (1938).
5. George David Rappaport, The Sources and Early Development of the
Hostility to Banks in Early American Thought 42 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, New York University).
6. Id. at 40-42.
7. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 10 (1957); Rappaport, supra note 5, at 40. See
generally Theodore Thayer, The Land-Bank System in the American Colonies,
13 J. ECON. HIST. 145 (1953).
8. See Thayer, supra note 7, at 151-52.
9. See id. at 151.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
11. See EAST, supra note 4, at 25.
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Perhaps there was a good reason for the nonexistence of a
Colonial mercantile bank. The tradition of the individual
capitalist was strong, although individual capitalists were
not extraordinarily wealthy. English houses provided the
large-scale finance needed, and Colonial governors granted
few business corporate charters.12  Benjamin Franklin
thought in 1764 that the balance of trade would prevent an
American mercantile bank from keeping its specie, 3 a fear
voiced by the opponents of banks in the middle 1780s. But
it is risky to assert that mercantile banking would have
been impossible under colonial conditions. The Revolution
certainly triggered the first bank charter grant."4 But the
same commercial forces underlying the Revolution might
have created an American mercantile bank in any case.
Robert Morris, founder of the BNA, hinted that a Colonial
bank had been in the offing:
However, though the old [colonial] government had no idea of a
bank, the commercial men of the province had: and I, as a
merchant, laid the foundation of one; and established a credit in
Europe for the purpose. From the execution of this design, I was
prevented only by the revolution.
15
Whatever the reason for the dearth of colonial banks, it
was not a lack of models in the Old World. There was plenty
of British banking theory developed before the American
Revolution, 6  and Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations
contained banking theory and a description of banking
12. See id. at 25-26; see also 2 DAVIS, supra note 3, at 5-6 (discussing reasons
for general scarcity of business corporations). As of the Revolution, there were
three water works corporations in Rhode Island, a docks corporation each in
Massachusetts and Connecticut, and an insurance corporation in Pennsylvania.
Id. at 4, 22.
13. Benjamin Franklin, Remarks and Facts Relative to the American Paper
Money (1764), in 2 AM. MUSEUM 17, 22 (1787).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 30-31.
15. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA,
ON THE MEMORIAL PRAYING A REPEAL OR SUSPENSION OF THE LAW ANNULLING THE
CHARTER OF THE BANK 37 (Matthew Carey ed., Philadelphia, Seddon &
Pritchard 1786) [hereinafter BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS]; see also GEORGE
STARNES, SIXTY YEARS OF BRANCH BANKING IN VIRGINIA 11 (1931) (discussing
evidence of planned "James River Bank" in Virginia); WILLIAM GOUGE, THE
CURSE OF PAPER-MONEY AND BANKING 200 (Greenwood Press 1968) (1833)
(mentioning "traces of a Bank in Virginia").
16. See generally LLOYD W. MINTS, A HISTORY OF BANKING THEORY IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 13-41 (1945).
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practices that would influence the early Republic. 7 More
significantly, English, Scottish, and Continental models-
especially the Bank of England-were known to the
Colonists, and figured into the early post-Revolutionary
bank debates. 8 However, Americans may have had more
theoretical than operational knowledge of banking, and the
earliest United States mercantile banks might have had to
piece operations out by themselves. 9 Furthermore, these
models, although useful, were copied selectively. American
banking charters developed in distinctly American ways, for
distinctly American reasons. The idea that United States
institutions were slavish copies of English ones" is just
plain wrong. Bank of England charter language was indeed
copied verbatim, but copied with a sharp eye to American
context.2' There is a lot of mindless copying in United States
banking law-but the templates are those of earlier
American charters, not foreign ones.
B. The Classical Mercantile Bank
The classical United States mercantile bank of the late
eighteenth century was exemplified by the Bank of North
America ("BNA"). The BNA, which started operating in
1782, was the model for all banks of the 1780s and most
banks of the early 1790s." The BNA had tremendous
intellectual and operational influence on the early banks. A
17. See, e.g., HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 39 (James Madison);
BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 106 (Thomas FitzSimons);
see also 7 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 236-56 (Harold C. Syrett &
Jacob E. Cooke eds., Colum. Univ. Press 1963) [hereinafter HAMLON PAPERS]
(essay on Hamilton's influences as reflected in his Report on a National Bank).
18. See, e.g., 1 FRITz REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMEICAN BANKING 5-7
(Johnson Reprint Corp. 1968) (1947).
19. See Letter from John Wilson, BNA Accountant, to Joseph Pemberton
(Apr. 1, 1782), in George David Rappaport, The First Description of the Bank of
North America, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 661, 665-67 (1976); Letter from Thomas
Willing, BNA President, to William Phillips et al. (Jan. 1784), in N.S.B. GRAS,
THE MASSACHUSETTS FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON 1784-1934, at 209-10
(1937). There were some operational banking texts at the time. See, e.g., 1
MALAcHY POSTLETHWAYTE, THE UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF TRADE AND
COMIERCE 193-201 (Augustus M. Kelley 1971) (4th ed. 1774).
20. See, e.g., Stephen K. Halpert, The Separation of Banking and Commerce
Reconsidered, 13 J. CORP. L. 481, 491 (1988).
21. See infra notes 270-89 and accompanying text.




small, but telling, example: the Massachusetts Bank
(founded in 1784) had the same six staff positions as the
BNA-cashier, teller, sub-teller, accountant, runner, and
porter.23
The classical mercantile bank exemplified by the BNA
did not last long. Its business practices only persisted for
two or three decades, when domestic manufacturing
displaced foreign trade as the cutting edge of the American
economy. But some of that early germ plasm has survived
over two hundred years of subsequent evolutionary
pressure. There are two reasons for this. First, the late
eighteenth century was an extraordinarily creative period
in American life, which has left many contemporary traces.
Think of the Constitution, an eighteenth-century document
governing a twenty-first-century polity, with only a few
amendments. As with the Constitution, eighteenth-century
banking forms persist: partly functional, partly traditional,
and partly constitutive.
There is a second reason for this persistence of old
forms. Not only was the late eighteenth century an
extremely creative time, but the subsequent legal milieu
has been extremely conservative. Until effective bank
supervision and regulation were invented with the New
York Safety Fund System24 and developed through the
National Bank Act25 in the mid-19th century, banking was
almost exclusively regulated by charter. These charters
tended to incorporate provisions from earlier charters,
frequently without much thought as to their original
purpose.2 Legal restrictions that were not too dysfunctional
tended to ossify. With the passage of time, many of the
charter restrictions remained, sometimes for good,
sometimes for ill, and sometimes for no purpose. After the
invention of bank regulation and supervision, evolutionary
pressure on the charter-low enough already-shrunk even
more. A charter need not be amended by a legislature when
a regulator can interpret the problems away.
23. GRAS, supra note 19, at 27. The Massachusetts Bank did not actually fill
the sub-teller position. Id.
24. See HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 559; J.T.W. HUBBARD, FOR EACH, THE
STRENGTH OF ALL: A HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 73-77
(1995); Ross M. ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION 25-26
(1995).
25. ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 70-75.
26. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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The result can be an astonishing conservatism in
legislative language. An example: In 1936, Bray Hammond
noted that the word "association," applied to national
banking corporations, was a relic of a banking debate that
had taken place a century ago.27 Sixty-five years later,
national banking corporations are still called
"associations."2
Those creative first few years of United States banking
law have thus cast their dead hand across generations of
United States banking history. Of course, these early legal
precedents have affected banking law more than banking
practice. But legal commands do more than constrain
behavior; legal thought is partially constitutive of general
social discourse. The positive commands of banking law
translated into normative ideas of what a bank should be.
1. The Charters. An examination of these mercantile
banks begins with their charters. The earliest charters were
extremely unrestrictive. The earliest charter of all-that of
the Bank of North America-was the least restrictive of
them all.
The Revolution produced the BNA. The BNA,
headquartered in Philadelphia, was chartered on the last
day of 1781 by the Continental Congress. 29 It was chartered
to finance the United States in war and provide a stable
replacement for the depreciated Continental currency. The
BNA was granted monopoly powers by several states for the
duration of the war.3 The Bank successfully obtained
several state charters, being uncertain about the chartering
authority of the Continental Congress.32 The British
surrendered at Yorktown shortly before the bank was
chartered, government financing became less significant
27. Bray Hammond, Free Banks and Corporations: The New York Free
Banking Act of 1838, 44 J. POL. ECON. 184, 209 (1936).
28. Id. A more extensive example of persistence? See infra Appendix
(comparing the modern federal bank charter with the 1838 New York free
banking charter). Many tropes of language have survived intact these years.
The only significant difference is the modem charter's detailed treatment of
bank securities powers. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
29. See HAMIOND, supra note 7, at 50.
30. Id. at 49; LAWRENCE LEWIS, JR., HISTORY OF THE BANK OF NORTH AMERICA
31 (Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1882).




within a year or so, and commercial trade became the
raison d'Otre of the bank. The monopoly protection of the
BNA disappeared with the Treaty of Paris in 1783.
The 1781 Continental charter for the BNA was almost
purely enabling, with almost no restrictions, save that on
capitalization." Its powers were virtually undefined, and its
lifetime perpetual, with the main limit being a cap of $10
million in capital. 4 Indeed, except for the capitalization
limit (which was far higher than the $400,000 capital
actually injected), 5 the Continental charter was even more
permissive than the charter sought by Robert Morris.
Morris suggested that the Continental government have the
power to examine the bank; this power did not find its way
into the Continental charter. The legal power of the
Continental Congress to issue the charter was the sole
subject of legislative contention.36 There is no evidence of
any argumentation over its open-ended terms. The 1782
Pennsylvania charter was a mere copy of the Continental
charter although it was not enacted without a political
tussleY
The pattern of the earliest BNA charter was repeated in
several different states, at several different times.
Legislators did not seem to care about the terms of many of
the early state bank charters. Whatever powers the nascent
bankers wanted, they usually got. Few future charters were
as loose-textured as the BNA's, but several comparatively
unrestricted charters were issued in the next few years: to
the Massachusetts Bank (1784),38 the Bank of Maryland
(1790),"9 and the Providence Bank (1791).40 There is no
record of any controversy attending the Maryland or
Massachusetts bank charters. The Providence Bank charter
was even more extreme. It was, in effect, a state ratification
of a document drawn up by its shareholders, with some
additional terms added by the legislature.4' This was not
33. LEWIS, supra note 30, at 127-32.
34. See HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 12-14.
35. LEWIS, supra note 30, at 133 (1000 shares of $400 apiece).
36. See HAMIIOND, supra note 7, at 51.
37. LEWIS, supra note 30, at 44; see also infra Part II.A (Pennsylvania
chartering).
38. 2 DAVIS, supra note 3, at 47.
39. Id. at 49.
40. See id. at 49-50.
41. Stat. R.I. (Oct. 1791).
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uncommon for the earliest charters, banking and
nonbanking.42
It is important to note that the earliest charter terms
were simply those convenient to the merchants. Even later,
charter terms were seldom inimical to the merchants'
perceived self-interests. The state had a relatively limited
interest in these earliest mercantile banks. They were often
perceived as a source of credit to the state, and perhaps
secondarily as a source of stable paper currency and as a
stable payments system.43 But-with the exception of the
earliest years of the BNA and the Bank of the United
States-these banks were seen by the states themselves as
predominantly a mercantile concern. As a consequence,
state interest in the terms of these charters was relatively
insignificant, at least at the beginning.' United States
banking was a merchants' invention, and the charters are
best considered as indicia of merchants' banking practices.
Very significantly, the bank founders did not usually
want unlimited powers. The founders of these earliest
banks had good reasons of their own for charter
restrictions. To understand why this was so, a detailed
examination of the mercantile banking business is required.
2. The Merchants' Utility-A Credit Club. The
mercantile bank exemplified by the BNA was best viewed
as a public utility for merchants, "a kind of credit union for
its merchant-owners."" "Merchants- wholesalers active in
the import-export business-were expected to control these
banks.6
A bank is a sort of mercantile institution, or at least has such a
close connexion with the whole mercantile interest, that it will
more naturally and properly fall under the direction of merchants,
than of any other sort of men less acquainted with its nature and
principles, and less interested in its success.
42. 2 DAVIS, supra note 3, at 316.
43. See RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BusINEss
CORPORATION: 1784-1855, at 53 (1982).
44. See id. at 53-54; infra Part I.B.2.
45. HAROLD VAN B. CLEVELAND & THou s F. HUERTAS, CITIBANK 1812-1970,
at 8 (1985).
46. See Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 15, 21.
47. Pelatiah Webster, An Essay on Credit: In Which the Doctrine of Banks Is
Considered, and Some Remarks Are Made on the Present State of the Bank of
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Bank directors "were merchants advancing their own
money, as they felt, to other merchants."48 These mercantile
banks permitted merchants to pool their scarce credit and
scarcer specie, and augment it with that of foreign
shareholders. As Thomas Paine, an unlikely but avid
apologist for the BNA, wrote:
It is the convenience which the stockholders, as commercial men,
derive from the establishment of the bank, and not the mere
interest they receive, that is the inducement to them. It is the
ready opportunity of borrowing alternatively of each other that
forms the principal object: and as they pay as well as receive a
great part of the interest among themselves, it is nearly the same
thing, both cases considered at once, whether [the bank's profit] is
more or less.49
These banks were founded because of the scarcity of
credit in America. America may have been an
entrepreneurial country, but its rich citizens were simply
not very rich, by European standards."0 Almost nobody in
the post-revolutionary United States had accumulated
enough liquid wealth to constitute a rentier class; the
private family banks of Continental Europe were simply
inconceivable in America.5' The only way to get enough
credit was to pool it among the moderately wealthy
mercantile entrepreneurs who needed it the most, with the
addition of whatever specie outside (mainly foreign)
investors were willing to contribute.
This pooled credit was used to facilitate mercantile
transactions: import, export, and distribution.
Consequently, credit terms were short,52 and payment
North-America, in POLITICAL ESSAYS ON THE NATURE AND OPERATION OF MONEY,
PUBLIC FINANCES AND OTHER SUBJECTS 427, 439 (Burt Franklin 1969) (1786).
48. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 74. One can carry this idea too far. Even the
earliest banks had some non-mercantile customers. The Massachusetts Bank,
for example, extended credit to private bankers and brokers, and auctioneers.
GRAS, supra note 19, at 56-58. Nevertheless, the majority of customers of all the
early banks were merchants. See id. at 45, 54.
49. 2 THOMAS PAINE, Dissertations on Government; the Affairs of the Bank;
and Paper Money, in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 132, 170-71 (Moncure
Daniel Conway ed., G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1894).
50. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
112-13 (1992).
51. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 68-69.
52. The rechartering debates of 1786 indicate that the credit terms of the
BNA were usually forty-five days. See BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra
1022 [Vol. 49
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expected to be prompt.53 Endorsers of notes were expected to
stand behind their name."M These businesslike practices
seemed onerous to debtors accustomed to more forgiving
business behavior,55 and led to great political controversy in
the first decades of banking.56 In the course of things, these
banks provided a source of circulating currency. But the
circulation of this currency was incidental to its main
function: permitting the banks' merchant customers to
conduct their business. It was the credit behind the
currency that the merchants wanted, more than the
currency itself.
A BANK is a large repository for cash, deposited under the
direction of proper officers (say, a president and directors) for the
purpose of establishing and supporting a great and extensive credit,
to be made use of in every case where an established credit will
answer in exchange or payment as well as cash, or better than cash,
as in man circumstances will manifestly and undoubtably be the
case ....
Indeed, some supporters of the BNA went so far as to
insist that bank notes were not paper currency. 5 The
incorporators of the Massachusetts Bank felt as if they had
no responsibility to supply bank note money in the late
1780s and early 1790s. Nor did the October 1789 petition
note 15, at 80. The BNA's 1782 by-laws permitted sixty days' credit. At the time
of its founding in 1784, the Bank of New York only extended thirty days' credit,
with no accommodation. HENRY W. DOMETT, A HISTORY OF THE BANK OF NEW
YORK 1784-1884, at 19 (4th ed., Riverside Press 1922) (1884).
53. Several early bank charters stressed the importance of punctuality. The
preamble of chapter 13 of the 1790 Maryland Bank charter read "whereas it is
absolutely necessary that debts due to the said bank should be punctually paid,
to enable the directors to calculate with certainty and precision on meeting the
demands that may be made upon them." Stat. Md. ch. 90 (1790). The 1791
preamble to the Providence Bank charter listed "promoting Punctuality in the
Performance of Contracts" as one of the virtues of a bank; the Bank of
Richmond had a similar charter clause in 1792. Stat. R.I. (Oct. 1791); Stat. Va.
ch. 77 (1792).
54. See EAST, supra note 4, at 259-60.
55. DOMETT, supra note 52, at 29 (Bank of New York accused of being
uncompassionate toward creditors).
56. See infra Part fl.A.
57. Webster, supra note 47, at 433.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 66, 81.
59. See OScAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY
OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS,
1774-1861, at 120-22 (1947).
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of the Bank of New York for a charter so much as mention
provision of currency as an advantage that the Bank would
provide the State, if incorporated."
3. A Credit Club-Not a Money Club. The earliest
United States banks therefore provided credit, and currency
was at best an incidental means to credit. As a goal,
currency was a state interest, at least before state currency
was proscribed by the Constitution. (Not until Hamilton's
Bank of the United States was the idea of banking solidly
melded with provision of paper currency.)6' To be sure, the
petition for a charter for the Massachusetts Bank
mentioned that the bank would provide a medium of
exchange,62 although there was no express note-issuing
authority in its 1784 charter.6' However, the 1789 petition
of the Bank of New York for a charter contained no such
provision,' and currency was only weakly alluded to in the
elaborate preamble of the Providence Bank charter, which
contained an extensive apologia for banking.65
In the great BNA bank charter debate of 1786, there
was little evidence that either mercantile or agrarian forces
considered bank notes to be a real substitute for state-
issued paper currency, and much evidence that the two
kinds of paper were considered to be two different-even
incompatible-things. The agrarian radical William Findley
(of whom much shall be said below) even viewed the BNA
as "inimical to the emission and credit of paper money.""
60. See DOMETT, supra note 52, at 32-33.
61. See infra Part II.B.1.
62. See GRAS, supra note 19, at 23.
63. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF BANFING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED
STATES 321-24 (Herman E. Krooss ed., 1969) [hereinafter BANKING &
CURRENCY].
64. See DOMETT, supra note 52, at 32-33.
65. The relevant portion of the Providence Bank charter (written by the
incorporators) reads:
Taught by the Experience of Europe and America, that well-regulated
Banks are highly useful to Society, by promoting Punctuality in the
Performance of Contracts, increasing the Medium of Trade, facilitating
the Payment of Taxes, preventing the Exportation of Specie, fiurnishing
for it a safe Deposit, and by Discount rendering easy and expeditious
the Anticipation of Funds on lawful Interest, advancing at the same
Time the Interest of the Proprietors ....
Stat. R.I. (Oct. 1791).
66. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 69. But see 1 JAMES
WILSON, Considerations, on the Power to Incorporate the Bank of North
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Findley and Thomas Paine were opponents in this debate,
but both denied the monetary status of bank paper. New
York and Philadelphia merchants, users of bank paper,
were quite unenthusiastic about state issues of money in
the 1780s. They preferred their own, more private bank
credit instruments. The states may have wanted banks to
provide-or at least facilitate-a public paper currency, but
the bankers were of another mind.
"Money" was not a homogeneous concept in the 1780s
(and remains intellectually contested today)." There were
many different kinds and notions of money, which satisfied
different needs of the community and had different
partisans. Specie, being universally acceptable, was in a
class of its own, but any kind of paper could be money (or
for the more prudish, a money substitute). State and federal
debt securities, although debased, were frequently used as
paper currency, a point stressed by Alexander Hamilton in
his Report on Public Credit.69
Different forms of paper currency had different
constituencies. Loan office currency, issued by the state,
was an extremely democratic form of money-the favorite of
agrarians.70 Bills of exchange were at the opposite extreme,
a form of semi-private semi-currency, potentially negotiable
into the stream of commerce, but generally transferred only
between merchants. Bank notes, when considered at all,
were another alternative, intermediate between loan office
currency and bills of exchange, in both safety and
exclusivity.7' As discussed above, both friends and foes of
America, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 549-55 (James D. Andrews ed.,
Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896).
67. See DOMETT, supra note 52, at 29-30; see also BNA DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 80-81 (Robert Morris).
68. For a recent discussion of some tensions in the law of money, see Joseph
H. Sommer, Where Is a Bank Account?, 57 MD. L. REV. 1, 10-23 (1998). The
most significant modem treatment of money probably remains Simmel's. See
GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY (Tom Bottomore & David Frisby
trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1978) (1907).
69. See 6 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 70-72.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 186-88, 235.
71. Indeed, one bank supporter viewed checking accounts-similar to a bill
of exchange-as a superior form of bank money to bank notes:
The advantage [of bank money] would be still greater, if, instead of
bank-bills, the owner would take a bank credit, and draw checks on the
bank whenever he needed his money; this would enable him to pay any
sum exactly, without the trouble of making change; he would be able in
any future time to prove his payments ....
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banks considered bank notes as a money of the rich.
Friends of banks, generally opposed to state currency,
viewed specie as the proper currency for the poor, rather
than small-denomination bank notes."
Banks in the 1780s were therefore not uniquely
responsible for currency. Indeed, they were usually not
considered a particularly significant source of currency in
the United States, and the currency they provided was for
the rich. Unlike England, paper currency was associated
with the state. The debates over ratification of the
Constitution are instructive. The convention thought it
knew exactly what kind of monetary constitution it was
making73 and inserted several interlocking clauses designed
to prevent the monetary abuses of the 1770s and 1780s
from recurring." The prohibition of emission of state
currency was a hot topic in the ratification debates,
especially in the South. The debaters seemed aware of two
classes of money: specie and state notes. Neither side
seemed to discuss bank paper money at all as a third
possible alternative.75 In later life, Madison stated that the
framers of the Constitution had not contemplated bank
Webster, supra note 47, at 434.
72. See MINTS, supra note 16, at 148 (discussing small note controversy at
dawn of free banking era). The opposition to small notes dates back at least to
the practices of the eighteenth-century Bank of England. See id. at 21. Smith
justified restriction of small notes because otherwise, the notes of
uncreditworthy issuers would be accepted in circulation. See ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 343-45
(Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. Chi. Press 1976) (1776).
73. See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1774-1970, at 8 (1973).
74. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5-6 (permitting Congress to coin money
and punish coinage and securities counterfeiters); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1
(prohibiting states from coining money, emitting bills of credit, creating
nonspecie legal tender, impairing contracts).
75. See, e.g., James Madison, Notes for Speech Opposing Paper Money (Nov.
1, 1786), in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 392-402 (Philip Kurland & Ralph
Lerner, eds., 1987); Records of the Federal Convention (1788), in 3 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at 393; Luther Martin, Genuine Information
(1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at 394; THE FEDERALIST No.
44 (James Madison) (excerpt), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
supra, at 393; Charles Pinckney, South Carolina Ratifying Convention (May 20,
1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at 395-96; Debate in North
Carolina Ratifying Convention (June 15, 1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra, at 400-02.
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emissions," notwithstanding the three banks operating in
1787. Hurst is probably correct in concluding that the
"limited resources and the relative isolation of [the early
banks'] operations did not add up to a situation likely to
make the constitution makers perceive private bank notes
as a significant expression of state law affecting the money
supply."77 The Framers' neglect of bank money led to a
standard Constitutional argument against the authority of
the federal government to charter banks, used until around
1830. The argument held that bank notes were not money
and, thus, fell outside the Constitutional authority granted
Congress to regulate money. 8
At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, a virtual
symposium on money was published in The American
Museum, a magazine published by Mathew Carey. The best
of the essays, by John Witherspoon, favored both bank and
loan office money, although was very cautious about the
latter.7' The rest of the essays barely touched on bank
money, concentrating on state paper emissions. One essay,
arguing for a land-based loan office, repeated James
Steuart's objections to mercantile banking. Most essays
seemed to simply assume that only state paper could be
money.81 Shortly before, Thomas Paine had drawn a sharp
76. Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (Feb. 2, 1831), in 3
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITuTION, supra note 75, at 463.
77. HURST, supra note 73, at 11-12; cf. 1 WILLIAM GRAHAm SUMNER, A
HISTORY OF BANKING IN ALL THE LEADING NATIONS 144 (New York, J. of
Commerce & Commercial Bulletin 1896) (stating that BNA and Bank of
Massachusetts bank notes were regarded by the framers of the Constitution "as
credit instruments of a different character" than currency).
78. RICHARD H. TIMBERLAKE, THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN THE
UNITED STATES 8, 36 (1978).
79. See JOHN WITHERSPOON, ESSAY ON MONEY (Phila., Young, Stewart &
M'Culloch 1786), reprinted in 2 Am. MUSEUII 47 (1787).
80. See WILLIAMi BARTON, THE TRUE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES (Phila.,
C. Cist 1786), reprinted in 2 A I. MUSEUMi 32 (1787). Sir James Steuart was an
influential banking theorist of the day. He was opposed to mercantile banking
because its assets were no better than the credit-the promises--of merchants.
He preferred banking on collateral: either personal or real. In practice, this
meant real property. See 2 JAiES STEUART, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 471-83 (Andrew S. Skinner, ed., 1966). History has not
been kind to Steuart's banking theory; banking on real property was highly
risky, because property was far more illiquid (and no more reliable) than
merchants' promises.
81. One of these essays (in favor of hard money) explicitly mentioned the
BNA, without discussing its paper as money at all! See Nestor, Thoughts on
Paper Money, 2 Am. MUSEUI 42 (1787). Nestor, along with others, may have
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distinction between (evil) state paper currency and bank
notes, which Paine held not to be paper currency at all. 2
Certainly, after 1791, banks were henceforth intimately
connected with monetary policy. But it is important to keep
in mind that, in the formative decade of the 1780s, bank
notes were generally deemed a form of circulating credit not
quite money. In the 1780s banks were not public
institutions, and their money not a public good.
C. The Merchant's Utility
1. A Private Club. To a large extent, then, the
mercantile banks could be considered merchants' utilities,
chartered perhaps as public corporations, but operated as
private credit clubs. These mercantile banks were suffused
with only a limited public spirit. The BNA, for example,
refused to become a national bank in 1790, even though
invited to do so by Hamilton.83 Robert Morris publicly stated
as early as 1786: "I must confess that I do not wish to see
government attached to [the BNA]. It is better to keep it for
the benefit and promotion of trade and commerce."8 In an
earlier, more private communication, Robert Morris
characterized the BNA as "a mere private Thing in which
any Man my be interested who chuses to purchase Stock.""5
assumed that bank money was a mere specie substitute, rather than a separate
form of money. See, e.g., Janet A. Riesman, Money, Credit, and Federal Political
Economy, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 128, 137-42 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
82. 2 PAINE, supra note 49, at 176-87.
83. LEWIS, supra note 30, at 86-90.
84. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 30.
85. Letter from Robert Morris to John Wendell (May 1, 1782), in 5 THE
PAPERS OF ROBERT MORRIS 1781-84, at 95 (E. James Ferguson & John
Catanzariti eds., 1980) [hereinafter MORRIS PAPERS]. John Wendell was a New
Hampshire merchant; Morris may have been trying to sell him some BNA
stock. Morris went on to say:
The Government have nothing to do with the Bank except meerly to
prevent the Directors should they be so inclined from extending their
Operations in a manner disproportionate to their Capital thereby
endangering their Credit. Any Aid which the Government derive from
the Bank is by lodging proper Securities with them and borrowing
money for short Periods ....
Id. at 95-96. Morris, of course, was "government" at the time, being
Superintendent of Finance. He may have been conflating his private role as
entrepreneur with his public role as Superintendent; the BNA charter did not
give the United States visitorial rights. Compare id. at 12 (clauses 11 and 13,
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This was in May 1782, only a few months after the bank
was chartered." The BNA may have been born a "public"
organization, but if it was, it did not stay so for long.
The Massachusetts Bank promptly reneged on most of
the promises it made the state to secure its charter in
1784. About twenty years after the fact, William Findley
remembered the First Bank of the United States as the first
public bank, stating that none of the state banks present
before the Bank of the United States "were instituted to
promote the regular, permanent, and successful operation of
the finances of the State."88 The public-minded BUS was an
anomaly, not a norm.
Historians frequently assert that early business
corporations were public enterprises, perhaps closer to
contemporary municipal corporations than contemporary
business corporations.89 This assertion seems correct as a
matter of legal doctrine, and-as shall be discussed-bears
considerable political truth. But the post-Revolutionary
merchants who actually conducted the corporations'
operations did not seem to concur with the lawyers or
politicians. Given the practical weakness of business
regulation by charter, it was the merchants' opinion that
counted. As we shall see, most of the terms of these
charters-at least the bank charters-were motivated by
forces internal to these banks.
To be sure, the mercantile banks had a public value
that went beyond their facilitation of trade." Bank notes,
perhaps limited in their circulation, nevertheless circulated.
the vistorial rights provisions in the proposed charter), with HISTORY OF THE
BUS, supra note 2, at 12-14 (BNA charter).
86. See Rappaport, supra note 5, at 18-21 (discussing Morris's conception of
the BNA); LEWIS, supra note 30, at 76-80.
87. See GRAS, supra note 19, at 22-23.
88. HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 215 (1810 rechartering debate for
First BUS). Findley had been an effective opponent of the BNA in 1785, but had
become an advocate of the Bank of the United States over the years. He may
have been trying to reconcile his two divergent positions, and this may have
affected his recollection. It does, however, seem consistent with other
information.
89. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1780-1860, at 111-12 (1977); Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the
American Corporation, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 51, 53-57 (1993).
90. See BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 28 (Robert
Morris) (citing state loans as public benefit of bank); DOMETT, supra note 52, at
32 ("one essential object of banks is to afford aid to the government").
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Banks provided fiscal agency and often direct aid to states,
through medium-term loans.91 (But the loyalty of these
early banks was to their stockholders first, and they would
not extend credit to the state if the banks deemed it
inappropriate.)92 The public value of these institutions was
acknowledged. The Massachusetts Bank, for example, was
referred to as "the State Bank," and its notes bore the
Commonwealth seal.9" The polity often wanted banks to be
far less private than they in fact were.
But little pertinent to business is lost by ignoring the
broader public interest inherent in mercantile banks. This
observation raises some questions. If the charters were
consistent with private mercantile interests, why did the
merchants want them, and why did the states grant them?
The beneficiaries of the private merchants' club still needed
public aid in maintaining their clubs.
2. That Needed the State. Charters conferred many
advantages, of which the most prominent-and perhaps
most overrated-was limited liability. Although the limited
liability controversy is complex, one only needs to
remember that banks are in the business of credit. Limited
liability diminishes credit: a point well understood at that
time.94 The Scottish system of unlimited-liability banking
was widely known, and the corporate form was not
necessary to provide limited liability, if it were desired.
Early Americans knew how to secure limited liability for
91. See Letter from Robert Morris (Jan. 8, 1782), in LEWIS, supra note 30, at
39-40 (circular letter sent to the governors of all the states); PELATIAH WEBSTER,
To THE STOCK-HOLDERS OF THE BANK OF NORTH-AMERICA, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE
OLD AND NEW BANKS 10-11 (Phila. 1791) (arguing that $50,000 cap on loans
from First BUS to states constituted derogation of state sovereignty, hindering
their ability to conduct internal improvements).
92. See, e.g., STARNES, supra note 15, at 23-24 (Bank of Alexandria refusing
credit to Virginia in 1794).
93. HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 59, at 107.
94. See generally Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the
American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 8-17 (1945). The limited
liability status of corporate charters was not clarified until the 1810-1860
period. See JArES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 26-27 (1970); see
also Shaw Livermore, Unlimited Liability in Early American Corporations, 43
J. POL. ECON. 674 (1935). Banks did not routinely enjoy limited liability until
the New Deal, and the wisdom of this policy remains controversial. See
generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank
Shareholders: History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (1992).
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passive investors without the corporation, through the
limited partnership device. 95 However, states did not
provide for limited partnerships until the 1820s. 96 Limited
liability on notes was also attainable by a legend on the
note, although this point might have been uncertain in the
late eighteenth century.
9 7
Limited liability was not the only attraction of the
corporate form, and many others have been noted. Two of
them were clearly useful, but just as clearly unnecessary.
The legal personality granted by the bare fact of
incorporation was useful for technical legal reasons, such as
suing on a note."5 The formal recognition of the state was
doubtless useful, for overall legitimacy,99 for prestige, 00 and
for the aid granted by state anti-counterfeiting laws, which
usually accompanied the charters.1"' However, these
features were clearly not necessary. Unchartered joint-stock
banks flourished in Scotland. °2 Even in the United States,
many early banks flourished without charters."3
The quasi-monopoly status of early chartered banks
could also be viewed as a source of state aid, and an
important reason for incorporating. Like today's public
utilities, the post-Revolutionary corporations were deemed
"natural" regional monopolies by many.' This view was by
95. Use of the limited partnership device dated back to seventeenth-century
France. Although not available in English law, the idea seemed familiar in the
United States. JOSEPH g. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 24 (Arno Press 1972) (1832).
96. Id. at 24 n.1.
97. This point became settled by the early 19th century. Riggs v. Swann, 20
F. Cas. 788 (C.D.C. 1827) (No. 11,831), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Mandeville v. Riggs, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 482, 484 (1829).
98. HURST, supra note 73, at 19; Rappaport, supra note 5, at 224-25.
99. See BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 44 (Robert
Morris) (suggesting that removal of BNA charter deprived bank of foreign
confidence).
100. HAMMIOND, supra note 7, at 67 n.2.
101. See 2 PAINE, supra note 49, at 174.
102. VERA C. SMITH, THE RATIONALE FOR CENTRAL BANKING 25-27 (Liberty
Press 1990) (1936). The Scottish experience could not be replicated in England
because the Bubble Act restricted English joint-stock companies in the 18th
century. See HAMi oND, supra note 7, at 4-6.
103. See HAMAiOND, supra note 7, at 144-45.
104. See 1 REDLICH, supra note 18, at 21; HAAMiOND, supra note 7, at 67-68.
Indeed, when the First BUS was founded, both the Banks of New York and
Massachusetts had some interest in merging with the national BUS. 2 DAVIS,
supra note 3, at 54-56. Hamilton was very uneasy about the prospect of
competition between the First BUS and the BNA. See Hamilton, Report on a
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no means unanimous. The virtues of competition were well
known in the late eighteenth century and were viewed by
many as applicable to banks. °5 But the natural monopoly
view was widely accepted, for some good reasons. Banks
could-and did-stage ruinous raids on each others'
resources by presenting large quantities of bills drawn on
the other.' Furthermore, there was a fear that an excess of
local banks would create an excess of credit.0 7 Finally, there
was the notion-not yet crystallized into positive law-that
a charter was a sacred promise, which would be abrogated
if additional charters were granted.' As a consequence,
banks were lumped in with bridge and turnpike
corporations, although explicit monopoly privileges were
National Bank, supra note 2, at 21, 26; see also HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note
2, at 37 (Jackson) (stating that the BUS "is an infringement of the [BNA]
charter").
105. See, e.g., BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 114 (Robert
Whitehill); SAMUEL BLODGET, ECONOMICA: A STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 161 (Washington, D.C. 1806). See generally Anna
Jacobson Schwartz, The Beginning of Competitive Banking in Philadelphia,
1782-1809, 55 J. POL. ECON. 417 (1947). The restrictions on interlocking
directorates that crept in to the charters of the early and middle 1790s were
consistent with an emerging pro-competitive policy. Hamilton himself waffled
on the monopoly issue. Compare Letter from Alexander Hamilton to
Gouverneur Morris (Feb. 21, 1784), in 3 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at
512-14, with Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris (Apr. 7,
1784), in 3 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 528-29.
106. See Schwartz, supra note 105, at 418-21; HAMmOND, supra note 7, at
84. This seemed to be particularly prevalent in Scotland during the 1760s, and
ended only in the early 1770s, when Scottish banks agreed to near-universal
note exchange. Charles W. Munn, The Origins of the Scottish Note Exchange,
107 THREE BANKS REV. 45, 47 (1975), reprinted in 2 FREE BANKING 263
(Lawrence H. White, ed., 1995).
107. See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Hamilton to William Seton, Cashier of
the Bank of New York (Jan. 18, 1791), in DOMETT, supra note 52, at 42 (" 'T is
impossible but that three great banks in one city must raise such a mass of
artificial credit as must endanger everyone of them.. .. "); ALFRED B. STREET,
THE COUNCIL OF REVISION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 427 (William Gould,
Albany 1859) (inflation caused by excess number of banks was an objection of
Justice Spencer to incorporation of the Merchants Bank in 1805).
108. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 67; Hamilton, Report on a National Bank,
supra note 2, at 15, 26 ("[Tihe Government of the United States ought not, in
point of candor and equity, to establish any rival or interfering institution, in
prejudice to the one already established... [in this case,] the Bank of North
America."); HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 37 (Robert Jackson). This
notion ultimately died with the Jacksonian revolution. See Charles River Bridge
v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 539 (1837); see also STANLEY I. KUTLER,
PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE 2-3
(1971).
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seldom granted, except in the case of some bridge
corporations."' The natural monopoly view of banks was
clearly not universally appreciated.
But monopoly was not particularly significant. Early
charters did not grant a monopoly, and legislative
unwillingness to grant additional charters did not seem
inherently fatal. Several early banks were quite willing to
operate for several years without a charter. The first and
best-known example was Hamilton's Bank of New York:
opened in 1784, chartered in 1791, and still in business
today."' But there were also other examples during this
period, such as the Bank of South Carolina (opened 1792,
chartered 1801)... and the Essex Bank (opened 1792,
chartered 1799).112 Unincorporated banking, which
flourished in the first decade or so of the nineteenth
century, 3 was viable until at least the Great Depression,
and still persists today. Brown Brothers Harriman is still a
bank, and still a partnership."'
Monopoly or other forms of state aid were not only
unnecessary; they were dangerous. Monopoly (or the scent
of monopoly inherent in the corporate form) bred
tremendous political unpopularity."5
This creates a minor mystery. Unincorporated joint-
stock banking was comparatively rare in the 1780s and
early 1790s, although it succeeded when it was tried. The
early bankers definitely wanted charters, even if the
charter was a mere ratification of a merchant's compact.
But the advantages of charters seemed modest. Limited
liability was at best a mixed blessing, and-as we shall
see-a charter could be an invitation to a disruptive bank
109. 2 DAVIS, supra note 3, at 320.
110. HAMDIOND, supra note 7, at 144-45.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., ALFRED COOKmAN BRYAN, HISTORY OF STATE BANKING IN
MARYLAND 22-24 (Johns Hopkins Studies in Hist. & Pol. Sci., Series 17, No. 1,
1899) (Union and Farmers' Banks in Maryland willing to operate without a
charter, pending legislative approval). The District of Columbia had a strong
early tradition of unincorporated banking from 1804-1811, because the charter
of the First Bank of the United States forbade incorporated banking in the
District. DAVID M. COLE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANKING IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA 23-30 (1959).
114. See Brown Brothers Harriman website, at http://www.bbh.com (last
visted Sept. 30, 2001).
115. See infra Part II.
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war. Legal personality, the aura of the state, and anti-
counterfeiting laws were nice, but did not seem essential.
Monopoly was almost never explicitly granted, and was
political poison, to boot. Maybe there was another
advantage to the corporate charter?
3. To Provide Internal Governance. The mercantile
banks were useful merchant's tools, but dangerous ones,
even to the friends of banks. From the beginning, this
merchant's tool was feared by the merchants themselves,
for special merchants' reasons. As a result, all of the
earliest charters, except the open-textured BNA charter,
contained provisions designed to protect the merchants
from their creations. Even the BNA had such protections, in
the form of by-laws.
Banks presupposed a large agglomeration of capital.
How to ensure that this agglomeration did not turn on the
merchant community that capitalized and used it? The
separation of ownership and control was the big corporate
law issue of the 1780s. Early merchants lived in fear that
the banking cooperative they capitalized would become the
tool of their bank's directors. The bank charters of the
1780s and 1790s were the battleground upon which this
corporate war was fought, and the separation of banking
and commerce the result.
As a source of credit, the mercantile bank was useful; as
a potential competitor, it was dangerous. "The bank, for
aught we know, might become a trading company; and, by
stopping discounts, at particular times, might take
advantage of the private merchants."116 In a contemporary
light, such a view might smack of special pleading. But it
was considered good public interest reasoning in the late
eighteenth century, especially with monopolistic banks.
Throughout the eighteenth century and into the early
nineteenth century, few charters were issued in businesses
that were already densely occupied by individual
entrepreneurs, and preservation of entrenched business
expectations was considered legitimate public policy.17
Indeed, virtually no United States trading corporation
of any kind was established in the eighteenth century,
116. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 113 (Robert
Whitebill).
117. See SEAVOY, supra note 43, at 73-75.
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despite some early interest by Alexander Hamilton in
1780.118 As Rufus King stated, discouraging a plan for
incorporating an Anglo-American trading company:
the Plan would be objected to as well on account of the general
unpopularity of monopolies in America as on the score of a defect
of power in Congress to create an Exclusive Corporation for the
Purpose of Trade.... [Olur merchants are numerous and full of
enterprize, and no way has suggested itself by which a limited
number of them could without undue preference be selected to
119
compose a company.
Even Robert Morris-the largest post-Revolutionary
merchant-was shocked by the notion of a trading company
with exclusive privileges.2' It is significant that the most
unpopular business corporations were trading companies.121
The failure of John Law's Mississippi Bubble-a bank-cum-
trading company-was a textbook horror story that evoked
strong memories long after 1780.122 It is easy to see why
banks were excluded from commerce from the very
beginning.
Unfair competition from the bank was not the only
mercantile fear. Unfair treatment by the bank was also
very significant. Many merchants-especially the smaller
ones-felt unfairly excluded from bank credit.' This was
not an unreasonable fear. Until the concept of competitive
banking became legitimized more than a generation later,
118. There were two abortive attempts at establishing Colonial trading
companies: the 1682 Free Society of Traders in Pennsylvania (which finally
disappeared in 1723), 2 DAVIS, supra note 3, at 4, and the stillborn New London
Society United for Trade and Commerce (chartered 1732). Id. at 87.
119. Id. at 288.
120. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 40 (Robert Morris).
121. See 2 DAVIS, supra note 3, at 287-88; see also BNA DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 23 (John Smilie invoking specter of trading
companies); HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 42 (James Madison invoking
specter of East India and South Sea companies).
122. See, e.g., RICHARD HILDRETH, THE HISTORY OF BANKS 20-26 (Augustus
M. Kelley 1968) (1837).
123. See, e.g., 2 DAVIS, supra note 3, at 68; EAST, supra note 4, at 259-60;
BRYAN, supra note 113, at 36; Rappaport, supra note 5, at 47-48. This point was
articulated in the petition against the BNA that caused it to lose its charter:
"the directors of the bank are enabled to give such preferences in trade, by
advances of money to their particular favorites, when most needed, as to
destroy that equality which ought to take place in a commercial country." BNA
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 15 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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those denied credit could fairly blame the antipathy of a
particular bank, rather than their own lack of
creditworthiness. 24 Furthermore, there was not enough
credit to go around, and some perfectly creditworthy
individuals might not get it.
12 5
The flip side of antipathy was favoritism. Not only were
merchants obliged to avoid bank enmity; they were well-
advised to secure bank friendship. Even Robert Morris, a
key figure in the Bank of North America who denied Bank
favoritism, conceded that shareholder's dividends were
insufficient incentive to hold stock.126 The greatest incentive
of merchants "to continue stockholders, is to support an
institution which affords them accommodation and
convenience, by means of discounts."'27 Accusations of
favoritism were even heard during shareholders'
meetings.' The earliest banks had no economic interest in
meeting the credit needs of their communities, even if the
credit needs were narrowly defined as mercantile needs.
They were merchants' clubs, and their members came first.
Some outsiders would be served, but no more than the
controlling merchants thought convenient. Indeed, the
Massachusetts Bank shrank in size shortly after it was
chartered, because it had too much capital for the business
that it wanted to do. 9
There is little evidence that the earliest mercantile
bankers engaged in gross self-dealing, although many later
banks, especially those in backwaters, were corruptly run. '
But creditworthiness was almost certainly not the only
factor that directors considered in extending credit;
antipathy and favoritism were significant.
124. See BRYAN, supra note 113, at 36.
125. See id.
126. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 44 (Robert Morris).
127. Id. at 95.
128. See, e.g., Letter from Jeremiah Wadsworth to Alexander Hamilton
(Jan. 9, 1786), in 3 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 645-46; EAST, supra
note 4, at 259-60.
129. See HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 59, at 121.
130. 1 REDLICH, supra note 18, at 26. Redlich thinks that managerial
corruption became more common in the early nineteenth century. See id. The
first bank failure, caused by self-dealing, was the Farmer's Exchange Bank in
1809. See HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 172-78; GOUGE, supra note 15, at 6-11. For
an extraordinarily funny contemporary description of bank abuses, see JOSEPH
G. BALDWIN, THE FLUSH TMES OF ALABAMA AND MISSISSIPPI: A SERIES OF
SKETCHES 63-64 (Sagamore Press 1957) (1853).
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Some mercantile fears were less creditable than unfair
treatment. Some merchants even feared the bank as a
source of credit because convenient mercantile credit would
lower commodity prices, and would impair the merchants'
own profits in providing credit. 13
1
Fears of unfair competition could be successfully
addressed by charter restrictions on bank powers. Fears of
unfair treatment were addressed-less successfully-by
governance restrictions on banks. The founders of banks,
along with the founders of the United States (the two
classes overlapped), were afraid of rule by faction. In the
first few years of banking, several governance restrictions
were tried-including regressive voting, rotation of
directors, and prohibitions on director interlocks. 32 These
governance restrictions were conjoint with the bank powers
charter restrictions-all were attempts by the mercantile
community to keep their creation docile.
It is here, perhaps, that the utility of the state-granted
charter has not been sufficiently recognized. The state
charter offered a fixed governance structure, of use to the
members of the corporation. A partnership is a mere
agreement between private parties, subject to dissolution or
novation. The old charters were something more
permanent, bearing the same relationship to a partnership
as a constitution does to a statute.13 3 This observation is no
anachronism: Hamilton used the very word "constitution" to
refer to the corporate charter, and the comparison was a
frequent trope of the era.3 1
131. See HANMOND, supra note 7, at 62; BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 15, at 96 (Robert Morris); Janet Wilson, The Bank of North America
and Pennsylvania Politics: 1781-1787, 66 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 9 (1942).
132. See infra text accompanying notes 154-64 (regressive voting), 165-70
(rotation), supra note 105 (interlocks).
133. HURST, supra note 73, at 16.
134. See HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 27 (Alexander Hamilton); 2
STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 113 (Garland
Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1793). The trope becomes common in the caselaw of the
1820s. See, e.g., Trustees of Darthmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 652 (1819) ("constitution of the corporation"); Bank of United States v.
Norton, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 422, 425 (1821); In re St. Mary's Church, 7 Serg.




The founders of the early banks needed to make some
credible commitments to their stakeholders.' 3' They had to
commit that they would not destroy their stakeholders'
livelihood with competing mercantile enterprises. They had
to commit that they would not exhibit excessive favoritism
to a small clique. The early BNA attempted to provide these
protections with by-laws. But in general, the mercantile
banks-especially those not clearly identified with a
trustworthy controlling party-provided these minority
protections with specific charter provisions.
Post-revolutionary merchants chose charter governance
of their banks for many of the same reasons that they chose
constitutional governance of their nation: constitutions are
harder to change than statutes, and are thus less
dependent on transient public sentiment."6 The charters of
yesterday were harder to change than by-laws, and thus
were less dependent on a transient majority of
shareholders. Legal provisions that must be permanent are
constitutionalized, especially if they exist to protect
minorities from majorities. Similarly, permanent corporate
governance provisions were welded into the early corporate
charter, which could not be changed without a legislative
act. The legislative process would provide an external forum
for the grievances of minority shareholders and other
stakeholders of the bank. It would also introduce a measure
of wildcard uncertainty, which could discourage any
amendment that was not absolutely necessary. A restrictive
135. By "stakeholders," I mean active shareholders and members of the
community who relied on the bank to remain a limited-purpose merchants'
utility. I do not discuss another class of stakeholders: the passive (usually
foreign) investors in the stock of mercantile banks. It is likely that they were
protected by a different device. The early banks did not keep their surplus, but
rather dividended out all profits that exceeded their capital. This device-an
early use of par value stock--can be viewed as a protection against the agency
costs of free cash flows. See Michael Jensen, The Agency Costs of Free Cash
Flow: Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 Ai. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986).
The directors-who benefited more from the mercantile bank's credit than the
value of its stock-would otherwise be tempted to use the retained surplus to
support additional lending to themselves and their friends. This additional
lending would likely be riskier on the margin, and hence less profitable to the
passive shareholders. It is worth noting that the Massachusetts Bank
downsized in the mid-1780s, HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 59, at 121,
probably because its lending capacity exceeded the community's credit capacity.
See infra text accompanying note 327. I do not know of any further historical
evidence for this explanation, although I have not looked for it.
136. See Maier, supra note 89, at 79-80.
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charter would therefore provide a measure of stability, and
protection for oppressed minorities. These points were
articulated, if not in the 1780s, a few decades later. Justice
Duncan, of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, had to
consider the validity of a corporate request for a charter
amendment:
[Tihe application for [charter] amendments must come from the
corporation-it must be a corporate act. But this does not prove
that the Court is precluded from inquiring into the whole
matter.., for then a corporate body might so modify the charter
as to keep themselves in power forever. Besides, there would be no
end to these changes, and every year there might be some new
bone of contention, and charters, which should be fixed and stable,
would vary as caprice or passion would direct, and of these
varieties and changes of constitution, as is said of making books,
there would be no end. I do not speak of the alteration of mere
regulations in the charter, which, experience had proved to be
incorrect or impracticable, but a radical change of the body
politic.137
Of course, Justice Duncan's opinion notes a weakness in
the legislative route: the legislature might choose to rubber-
stamp any amendment that a corporation sends it. But this
did not seem likely in eighteenth-century America: the
legislatures seemed quite willing to mediate corporate
disputes. 38 And Justice Duncan showed that the courts
were willing to step in when the legislature was not.
Perhaps the charter was not the only possible means
toward this end. Supermajorities in by-laws might afford
similar protection, especially if the by-laws required
supermajorities for their amendment. (The BNA actually
tried this, in the form of regressive voting for changes in by-
laws, by 1790.') But such by-laws, being subject to
substantive judicial scrutiny for fairness, "0 were legally less
reliable than charters.
137. In re St. Mary's Church, 7 Serg. & Rawle 517, 557 (Pa. 1822). The same
problem may exist today, and may call for similar solutions. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1848-59 (1989).
138. See, e.g., EAST, supra note 4, at 291 (describing Pennsylvania
experience); GRAS, supra note 19, at 62 (describing Massachusetts experience).
139. See 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 281 n.139.
140. See ANGELL & AMAES, supra note 95, at 184-88 ("The legislative power of
a corporation is not only restricted by the constitutional and statute law of the
state in which it is located, but by the general principles and policy of the
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The evolution of these provisions is very obvious in the
early bank charters. The first charter-that of the BNA-
had no explicit protection of any sort and mercantile
protection was entrusted to the by-laws. 14 1 The second
charter-the Massachusetts Bank-began to protect its
shareholders' livelihoods through charter restrictions on
bank activities. The third charter (actually the Bank of
New York joint-stock shareholder's compact) added the first
governance restriction.4 1 Thereafter, only one of the
remaining eighteenth-century charters had neither
governance nor power restrictions, 4 4 and most charters
usually had both.
The Massachusetts Bank introduced the first bank
powers charter restriction-a very straightforward
prohibition in its 1784 charter on employing "any money or
monies of the said corporation or body politic, in trade or
commerce." 45 The historian of this bank says that the trade
restriction was intended to keep it "from competing with
existing mercantile houses."46 In the 1786 reincorporation
debate of the BNA, its proponents claimed that it had a
similar prohibition in its Continental charter, for a similar
reason. This claim was not accurate, as the charter
imposed no limitations on the bank's power.' However,
such a limitation existed in the bank's by-laws, almost from
the beginning. Section 9 of these by-laws, dated November
4, 1782 read:
common law, as it is accepted there."). Angell and Ames wrote in 1832, but cited
enough old English case law to make their proposition credible for the 1780s.
141. E.g., text accompanying note 149.
142. Stat. Mass. ch. 2 (1784).
143. See DONMETr, supra note 52, at 32-35.
144. This was the 1795 charter of the Bank of Rhode Island. The two
eighteenth-century Rhode Island bank charters were extraordinarily
unrestricted. Unlike the first BNA charter, these charters were quite
sophisticated. The earlier Providence Bank was dominated by the Browns and
thus may not have needed governance restrictions; the Bank of Rhode Island is
less certain. EAST, supra note 4, at 300.
145. Stat. Mass. ch. 2 (1784).
146. GRAS, supra note 19, at 24.
147. See BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 90 (Robert
Morris) ("They are constrained by the charter from engaging in commerce."); id.
at 113 (Thomas Fitzsimons) ("The corporation is restrained from trading by the
charter.").
148. LEwIS, supra note 30, at 130-32.
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It is enacted and ordained by the Authority aforesaid; That the
Corporation shall not carry on any Trade, either domestic or
foreign; nor deal in any Article of Commerce, except in Bullion
Gold or Silver, public Funds, or in selling Goods mortgaged to it
and not redeemed, Lands or the Produce of Land purchased by the
Corporation. 49
Although these by-laws did not prevent the BNA from
acquiring land through mortgage, the BNA avoided real
estate activities as a matter of prudence. (The prudence was
well advised; real estate speculation bankrupted Robert
Morris.).. These by-laws are the earliest limitation of bank
powers in United States history. The Bank of New York is
another interesting case. From 1784 until 1791, it had no
charter, but operated as a joint-stock company under rules
written by the shareholders themselves. 5 ' These rules
specifically contained a prohibition on dealing in foreign
exchange, a mercantile specialty.152  Similarly, the
mercantile founders of the Bank of Hartford inserted a
charter restriction on trade in 1792.5'
Governance restrictions were introduced almost as soon
as restrictions on powers. Several of these earliest charters
also provided for regressive voting, whose mechanism and
purpose was explained by Alexander Hamilton in his Report
on a National Bank:
A vote for each share renders a combination between a few
principal stockholders, to monopolize the power and benefits of the
bank, too easy. An equal vote to each stockholder, however great
or small his interest in the institution, allows not that degree of
weight to large stockholders which it is reasonable they should
have, and which, perhaps, their security, and that of the bank,
require. A prudent mean is to be preferred.5 4
149. 7 MORRIS PAPERS, supra note 85, at 808. The by-laws were apparently
written by William Bingham. Id. at 822 n.58.
150. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 73.
151. DOMETT, supra note 52, at 11-15, 19-20.
152. Id. at 13.
153. P.H. WOODWARD, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE HARTFORD BANK 1792-
1892, at 18-19 (1892). The 1784 application of the Bank of New York for a
charter similarly contained a clause: "The Bank never to Engage in Trade." 3
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 519.
154. Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 28; cf. BNA
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 109 (John Smilie).
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Although this rationale can be read as providing for
community control of the merchants,155 it reads more
logically as providing mercantile control of the directors. In
theory, regressive voting would ensure that the respectable
merchants would collectively dominate the bank, but would
keep individual merchants (or factions) from oppressing the
rest. (One is reminded of the extremely limited political
suffrage of that era.) The rechartering of the Bank of North
America in 1787 (discussed below) was dominated by this
notion, with regressive voting as community control
perhaps a subtheme.
The Maryland and Providence Banks contained
regressive voting provisions in their charters;155 the Bank of
New York had such a provision in its original 1784 joint-
stock agreement.5 ' The 1784 Massachusetts Bank charter
did not contain such provisions,' although the politicized
1792 revision did.'59 Neither the 1781 BNA charter nor the
1787 recharter contained any regressive voting provision."'
Interestingly, the 1787 shareholders were far more
factionalized than the founding shareholders, and
regressive voting had been inserted by by-law in April of
1784.16 The Massachusetts Bank was also controlled by a
cohesive faction and had no regressive voting.'62  If
controlling shareholders did not fear each other, they would
not desire regressive voting: it would only dilute their
155. Hurst believes that Hamilton was afraid of the political power of the
BUS, and inserted rotation and regressive voting limitations in order to ensure
that the BUS was not captured by a faction set on using it as a political weapon.
HURST, supra note 73, at 274 n.157. This interpretation, although not at all
inconsistent with narrower business fears, seems more characteristic of
Hamilton's opponents than Hamilton. Hamilton had retained his dream of a
trading corporation as late as 1791. 8 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 75.
156. Stat. Md. ch. 9 (1790); Stat. R.I. (Oct. 1791).
157. DOMETT, supra note 52, at 12.
158. Stat. Mass. ch. 2 (1784).
159. Stat. Mass. ch. 158 (1792).
160. See HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 12-14 (1791 charter).
161. 7 MORRIS PAPERS, supra note 85, at 823.
162. EAST, supra note 4, at 294-95; GRAS, supra note 19, at 54. The founders
of the Bank of New York, the First Bank of the United States and the Bank of
Maryland did not come from a small, tight-knit mercantile community. EAST,
supra note 4, at 294-95, 303. On the other hand, the Bank of Providence, which
had regressive voting, was also dominated by the Brown family. Id. at 300. The
change in the BNA by-laws coincided with the opening of the BNA to a larger
group of investors, see LEWIS, supra note 30, at 52-53, and may have been
intended to provide assurance to them.
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control. It is interesting to note that almost every other
eighteenth-century bank had regressive voting."' The
abortive Pennsylvania Bank of 1784, proposed by a faction
excluded from the BNA,1" had regressive voting in its
proposed charter.
An allied, if less universal, means for controlling the
governance of mercantile banks was rotation of directors.
As Alexander Hamilton wrote in his Report on a National
Bank:
The continual administration of an institution of this kind, by
the same persons, will never fail, with or without cause, from their
conduct, to excite distrust and discontent. The necessary secrecy of
their transactions gives unlimited scope to imagination to infer
that something is or may be wrong. And this inevitable mystery is
a solid reason for inserting in the constitution of a bank the
necessity of a change of men. As neither the mass of the parties
interested, nor the public in general, can be permitted to be
witnesses of the interior management of the directors, it is reason-
able that both should have that check upon their conduct, and that
security against the prevalency of a partial or pernicious system,
which will be produced by the certainty of periodical changes.
Such, too, is the delicacy of the credit of a bank, that every thing
which can fortify confidence and repel suspicion, without injuring
its operations, ought carefully to be sought after in itsformation. 16
163. Of the thirty-one eighteenth-century charters surveyed by this author
(including the Massachusetts charter of 1784), twenty-five had regressive
voting provisions: New York Compact (1784), Coxe Proposal for Pennsylvania
Bank (1784), Maryland (1790), Bank of the United States (1791), New York
(1791), Providence (1791), Union Bank of Mass. (1792), Hartford Bank (1792),
Union Bank of Conn. (1792), New Haven Bank (1792), Bank of Alexandria
(1792), Richmond (1792), Albany (1792), Massachusetts (rechartered 1792),
Sullivan Proposal for State Bank in Massachusetts (1792), Pennsylvania (1793),
Columbia, Md. (1793), Baltimore (1795), Nantucket (1795), Merrimack (1795),
Rhode Island (1795), Norwich, Conn. (1796), Albany (rechartered 1797), Essex
(1799), Portland (1799). The only charters surveyed that did not contain
regressive voting provisions were: Bank of North America (1781, rechartered
1787), Massachusetts Bank (1784), Middletown, Conn. (1795), Delaware (1796),
Manhattan (1799).
164. See LEWIS, supra note 30, at 51-53.
165. HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 27-28; cf. id. at 464-65 (William
Findley, in 1810 debate on renewing charter of First Bank of the United States,
pointing to rotation as "artificial [i.e., intentionally planned] check" assuring
integrity of bank governance).
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Contrary to Hamilton's assertion that rotation was in
banks' interest, not all banks liked it. Rotation thus may
have been a genuinely public measure, imposed on bankers
rather than sought by them. The principle of rotation had
been enshrined in the Articles of Confederation, 166 and its
absence in the Constitution was deplored by Anti-
Federalists."' None of the earliest merchants' compacts
contained rotation, and the Bank of New York succeeded in
removing rotation from its charter in 1801.161 On the other
hand, the Bank of Albany successfully petitioned to have
rotation put into its charter in 1797,'169and rotation seems to
have been inserted in some early bank and insurance by-
laws when not specified by charter.'
7 0
The limited-purpose charter is no longer a standard
feature of corporate governance. Other devices have
replaced it where it is needed. However, merchants-
particularly bankers-still conduct cooperative economic
activity, and still need to protect themselves from the
competition of their cooperatives. Take, for example, the
Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation ("DTCC.") This
organization holds, clears and settles securities, for the
benefit of its members.' It is exclusively owned-and
controlled-by its users, including the major banks,
securities firms, and exchanges. It does no banking or
brokerage: just clearing and settlement. Another example is
S.W.I.F.T. ("Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication.") This firm, organized as a Belgian
cooperative society owned by financial institutions, boasts
Articles of Association that-although functioning today-
evoke the eighteenth century. First, S.W.I.F.T. has a
limited main object- "the study, creation, utilization and
166. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. 5, J 2.
167. An Officer of the Late Contintental Army, Independent Gazetteer (Nov.
6, 1873), reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 210, 212 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). This essay, allegedly written
by William Findley, claimed that lack of rotation was a defect in the
Constitution. See id. at 216 n.1. In his Report on a National Bank, Hamilton
carefully distinguished between corporate rotation (beneficial) and political
rotation (harmful). Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 27.
168. See ALLAN NEVINS, HISTORY OF THE BANK OF NEW YORK AND TRUST
CoMPANY: 1784 TO 1934, at 37 (1934).
169. 2 DAVIS, supra note 3, at 324-25.
170. See id. at 324.
171. See Depository Trust and Clearing Corp. website, at
http://www.dtcc.com (last visted Oct. 16, 2001).
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operation of the means necessary for the
telecommunication, transmission and routing of private,
confidential and proprietary financial messages."'72 Second,
voting stock power is "proportional to the usage of the
message transmission services of the Company by each
such Member."'73 Lastly, a supermajority vote is required
for modification of articles, share allocation rules, and a few
other enumerated issues. A change in the main object of
S.W.I.F.T. cannot be made under any circumstances."
II. THE EARLY CHARTER WARS
The earliest bank charters and joint stock compacts
show that corporate governance drove many charter
provisions. But only the earliest of the charters were
granted in a political vacuum. External politics, as well as
mercantile needs, influenced the early charters, if not the
early merchants' compacts. What perhaps may be
surprising is how readily merchants' desires meshed with
the broader political demands of the community.
Between 1784 and 1792, three wars over bank charters
were fought: the BNA, the first Bank of the United States,
and the Massachusetts Bank. The first of these wars-the
recharter of the BNA-was fought over a mixture of
banking and corporateness, and pitted agrarians and
outsider merchants against established merchants. The
language of this war was economic interest and ideology.
The BNA recharter debate, therefore, was at the center of
the social and intellectual forces acting on early business
corporations. The second great war-the initial chartering
of the First BUS-was more about the corporation rather
than banks. The parties to this war were roughly the same
as those to the BNA war, but the language of combat was
political and legal. The BUS debate, therefore, is of less
interest to this study than the BNA debate, although its
Constitutional implications make it a weighty event in
general United States history. The third war-over the
rechartering of the Massachusetts Bank-was less
172. S.W.I.F.T. By-Laws, art. 3 (1973) (as amended through June 13, 2001),
available at http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item_id=7229 (on file with Buffalo
Law Review).
173. Id. at art. 9.
174. Id. at art. 29.
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important than the first two, but presaged future bank
wars. In this war, the opponents were not agrarian and
mercantile interests. Rather, they could be characterized as
expansionary versus established business interests; the
same interests who were to fight in Jackson's Bank War.
Expansionary business interests also played a role in the
conclusion-and perhaps the beginning-of the BNA war.
In all three wars, the mercantile forces got most of what
they wanted. The concessions made to the foes of banks
were generally concessions of powers that bankers did not
particularly want.
A. The Bank of North America and the Dawn of
Corporophobia
Just as the BNA was the first bank, the 1785-87
rechartering of the BNA was the first great bank war. The
new charter contained most of the standard provisions
limiting bank powers: the old charter none. The BNA war
presaged the great bank wars of the future, and most of the
themes heard later were struck in the beginning. For these
reasons, the BNA charter war is the key to understanding
the political origins of American corporate law.
1. Prelude to Combat. An early skirmish was fought in
1782, when radical agrarian opponents of the BNA sought
to restrict the bank's Pennsylvania charter by inserting
clauses restricting the bank's life to seven years and
prohibiting it from holding real estate.'75 The opponents
lost.'76 Another, more significant, battle erupted in early
1784, when the Bank's sole position was challenged with an
attempt to organize another bank, the "Bank of
Pennsylvania."' This attempt involved established Quaker
merchants and others, who had been largely excluded from
the early bank group."' They seemed driven largely by a
175. ROBERT L. BRUNHOUSE, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA
1776-1790, at 111-12 (1971).
176. Id.
177. See id. at 150-51; Rappaport, supra note 5, at 50-51.
178. Rappaport, supra note 5, at 50-51; see also Schwartz, supra note 105, at
417-21; Wilson, supra note 131, at 3-4. The fight over the BNA was but a battle
in a larger war between radical "Constitutionalists" (including, but not limited
to, agrarians) and conservative "Republicans." Most Constitutionalists were
enemies of the BNA, and the BNA's fortunes in the Assembly followed those of
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feeling that they were being excluded by favoritism from
the BNA's discounts, as well as the healthy profits of the
BNA in 1783.179 After a legislative debate, this challenge
was defeated by the expedient of offering cut-price BNA
shares to the organizers of the new bank, and by inserting a
by-law forbidding any shareholder to vote more than 20
shares of stock. 8 '
The real problems began in early 1785, triggered by a
recession beginning in mid-1784. The non-mercantile
interests of Pennsylvania had remembered fondly the
colonial loan office and its relatively stable paper money,
and did not like the new bank. The new bank, thanks to its
limited capitalization, close management, short-term asset
structure, and favoritism, would lend to fewer people than
wanted loans and probably fewer people than were
creditworthy."' Some of those favored with credit were
unused to the mercantile bank's insistence on punctuality
in repayment.'82 On the liability side, the BNA did not issue
nearly enough currency to go around.'83 Worse yet, specie
drained overseas, paying for a flood of foreign imports,
drawn by peace. The BNA-consistently with the
mercantilist economic theory still regnant-was blamed for
facilitating this specie efflux.85
When the recession came, the BNA stopped discounts, a
prudent business decision, but politically costly. The BNA
(and much the same, its directors) remained opposed to the
paper currency, which the majority in the state Assembly
demanded to ease the economic pain.'86 The BNA's
opposition could be fatal to a state paper scheme. If the
BNA refused to accept deposits denominated in state paper,
it would be very difficult for the state paper to maintain its
value, even though the state paper issue was conservative
the Republicans. Brunhouse's monograph places the bank battle in the
perspective of the larger war. BRUNHOUSE, supra note 175, at 111-12.
Rappaport's dissertation is the most detailed account of the bank battle. See
Rappaport, supra note 5, at 50-68.
179. See BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 14-15 (Robert
Lollar).
180. Rappaport, supra note 5, at 50-68.
181. See Wilson, supra note 131, at 7-8.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 5.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 6.
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in size."' After an election won by the radical party, it was
time for the BNA's enemies to strike, and they struck
hard.1 8
8
On March 21, 1785, the Assembly received a petition
from citizens of Chester County to repeal the BNA's
charter.
Petitions from a considerable number of the inhabitants of Chester
county were read, representing that the bank established at
Philadelphia has fatal effects upon the community; that whilst
men are enabled, by means of the bank, to receive near three
times the rate of common interest, and at the same time receive
their money at very short warning, whenever they have occasion
for it, it will be impossible for the husbandman or mechanic to
borrow on the former terms of legal interest and distant payments
of the principal; that the best security will not enable the person to
borrow: that experience clearly demonstrates the mischievous
consequences of this institution to the fair trader; that impostors
have been enabled to support themselves in a fictitious credit, by
means of a temporary punctuality at the bank, until they have
drawn in their honest neighbors to trust them with their property,
or to pledge their credit as sureties, and have been finally involved
in ruin and distress; that they have repeatedly seen the stopping
of discounts at the bank operate on the trading part of the
community, with a degree of violence scarcely inferior to that of a
stagnation of the blood in the human body, hurrying the wretched
merchant who hath debts to pay into the hands of griping usurers:
that the directors of the bank may give such preference in trade,
by advances of money to their particular favorites, as to destroy
that equality which ought to prevail in a commercial country; that
paper money has often proved beneficial to the state, but the bank
forbids it, and the people must acquiesce: therefore, and in order to
restore public confidence and private security, they pray that a bill
may be brought in, and passed into a law for repealing the law for
incorporating the bank.
The complaint was a political success. By March 28, a
committee had studied the matter and reported that the
187. See id.
188. LEWIS, supra note 30, at 55-56; Rappaport, supra note 5, at 68-74.
189. LEWIS, supra note 30, at 56 n.1. This statement, extracted from the
March 21, 1785 minutes of the Pennsylvania State Assembly, is also quoted in 2
PAINE, supra note 49, at 155-58. Its reverberations extended to at least 1833,
when the petition and committee report were also reprinted as the appendix to
GOUGE, supra note 15, at 197-99.
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Bank's operations were inconsistent with public safety.9 '
The committee's report added a few new items: the bank
facilitated the balance of trade deficit, the BNA was
independent of government, and that "the accumulation of
enormous wealth in the hands of a society who claim
perpetual duration, will necessarily produce a degree of
influence and power, which can not be entrusted in the
hands of any set of men whatsoever, without endangering
the public safety."9 '
Most of the citizens' accusations were essentially of
unfair treatment. They did not allege that the world would
have been better off if the BNA had never existed, but
rather alleged that the BNA selected its beneficiaries
unfairly, and then treated them harshly by not extending
accommodation.'92 Several other of these accusations were
foolish, such as the one that the BNA facilitated fraud, or
the one confounding the BNA's (high) profits with the
BNA's (unexceptional) interest rates, or the one accusing
the BNA of raising market interest rates because its specie
capital would otherwise have been employed in long-term
low-interest loans. Another set of accusations concerned
harsh treatment of BNA debtors.9 ' The remainder of the
accusations concerned the monetary policy of the BNA;
accusations of economic merit. In contrast to the citizens,
most of the committee's accusations were more overtly
political, although their balance of trade accusations was
economic.
The bill repealing the BNA's charter received its second
reading on April 4, the same day the Assembly approved a
loan office. 9 This office was organized as a public
corporation, capitalized at 50,000 pounds, and authorized to
make loans between 25 and 100 pounds, at 6%,
geographically apportioned.'95 Its notes were not legal
tender and its capitalization conservative. Although it
provided an alternative currency and agricultural credit,
this loan office did not ease the antipathy against the Bank
of North America. Desperately, the BNA agreed to accept
state paper money in a separate account from specie, and
190. LEWIS, supra note 30, at 60.
191. GOUGE, supra note 15, at 198.
192. LEWIS, supra note 30, at 58.
193. Id.
194. Wilson, supra note 131, at 9-12.
195. Stat. Pa. ch. 205, §§ 10-11 (1785).
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hired James Wilson to defend it in front of the Assembly.196
James Wilson's argument relied largely on the contractual
sacredness of the charter which precluded abrogation by
the state that granted it. 9 This was a weak argument in
1785,198 and it was not enough-the state charter was
repealed on September 13, 1785.99
The repeal was not fatal to the BNA. It got another
charter in early 1786, by offering inducements to the tiny
state of Delaware."' (Delaware's history as a center of easy
incorporation thus has a long lineage.) This charter, which
had the same terms as the Pennsylvania and Continental
charters, seemed designed to forestall stockholders, as
much as protect the bank's business. A significant minority
of stockholders felt insecure enough to want the Bank to
liquidate, and the Delaware charter made this path legally
more difficult. Indeed, these disaffected shareholders went
so far as to obtain a unanimous shareholder's resolution to
test the legal status of the bank in court.2"' If the bank lost
such a test, the shareholders would have a right to demand
return of their specie stock. The directors, led by Robert
Morris, ignored this resolution, and continued to fight for a
reissue of the old charter.0 2 They eventually won, but not
before the first great American banking debate, in March of
1786.
Before discussing the 1786 debate, let us return to the
1785 Chester citizens' complaint, which triggered the
rechartering controversy.0 ' Politically successful as it was,
it reads strangely. Although formulated as an economic
196. Wilson, supra note 131, at 9-12.
197. See id.
198. Pennsylvania had effectively revoked the charter of the College and
Academy of Philadelphia in 1779. BRUNHOUSE, supra note 175, at 78. Perhaps
the BNA experience made Pennsylvania repent its treatment of the old College:
the old faculty was restored in 1789, with apologies. In re St. Mary's Church, 7
Serg. & Rawle 517, 565 (Pa. 1822). But the school still remains known by its
upstart name: the University of Pennsylvania.
199. See HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 54.
200. LEWIS, supra note 30, at 68-69.
201. Letter from Jeremiah Wadsworth to Alexander Hamilton (Jan. 9,
1786), in 3 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 645-46.
202. See Letter by Alexander Hamilton on Behalf of Bank Shareholders to
Jeremiah Wadsworth (Jan. 3, 1786), in 3 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at
642-44; Letter from John Chaloner to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 15, 1786), in 3
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 660; see Rappaport, supra note 5, at 149-
53.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 188-90.
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complaint, it made far better political than economic sense.
The chief claim, unfair treatment, is more of a political than
an economic complaint. The other claims of economic
damage were mostly weak, and generally translated to the
BNA's insistence on punctuality. Even the best of these
economic claims-regarding the BNA's monetary policy-
was largely political. Monetary policy has always carried
strong political overtones in United States history."4 The
subsequent committee report underscored the political
nature of the complaint.
Why did this complaint have such a powerful impact?
Two texts are particularly instructive. One, from the
committee report: "the accumulation of enormous wealth in
the hands of a society who claim perpetual duration will
necessarily produce a degree of influence and power which
can not be entrusted in the hands of any set of men
whatsoever without endangering the public safety.""' The
other, from the Chester citizens' complaint: "that the
directors of the bank may give such preference in trade, by
advances in money to their particular favorites, as to
destroy that equality which ought to prevail in a
commercial country."0 These fears were attached to banks,
but not exclusively to banks. These were fears of
corporations in general, and business corporations in
particular. These fears were not limited to the Bank of
North America, or to banking corporations, or to the 1780s.
2. Corporophobia. The first complaint, about
corporations and political corruption, was very clearly
expressed about ten years later. The New York Council of
Revision, objecting to a March 8, 1795 scheme for
incorporating a society of tradesmen and mechanics, wrote:
Because all incorporations imply a privilege given to one order of
citizens which others do not enjoy, and are so far destructive of
204. To a large extent, this is the theme of Bray Hammond's book. See
HAMIOND, supra note 7. But Jackson's Bank War was not the only time that
monetary policy has stood as proxy for a congeries of social issues. The silver
fight of the 1870s-1890s was another famous example. See RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, FREE SILVER AND THE MIND OF "'CoIN'" HARVEY, reprinted in THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 238 (Alfred E. Knopf
ed., 1965).
205. See supra text accompanying note 191.
206. See supra text accompanying note 192.
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that principle of equal liberty which should subsist in every
community; and though respect for ancient rights induced the
framers of the Constitution to tolerate those that then existed,
nothing but the most evident public utility can justify a further
extension of them....
... [Ejither the mechanics will influence the magistrates, and
the extensive powers of the corporation.. .be made at some future
day instruments of monopoly and oppression; or, which is more
probable, the [government] will obtain a controlling power over the
corporation of mechanics, and thus add to the extensive influence
which [the government] already enjoy[s] ... for the Governor and
Senators being now elected either by the State at large, or
extensive districts in which there will on many occasions be a
variety of sentiments, it must be obvious that a comparatively
small body of citizens uniting in one general object may, by their
weight, make the lightest scale preponderate.
Because the reason assigned in the preamble of this bill may
equally operate for the incorporation not only of the mechanics,
but of every other order of men in every county, whereby the
State, instead of being a community of free citizens pursuing the
public interest, may become a community of corporations
influenced by partial views, and perhaps in a little time (under the
direction of artful men) composing an aristocracy destructive to
the Constitution and independence of the State.
2 0 7
In contemporary terms, the Council of Revisions had
made an effective critique of the corporatism inherent in
corporations-or in this particular case, trade unions. The
fear of concentrated corporate power suborning government
is as recent as today's headlines,"8 and as old as the BNA.2 °9
The corporophobes were not speaking hypothetically.
1786-the same year that the BNA fought for its charter-
was the year the House of Commons began impeachment
207. STREET, supra note 107, at 261-62.
208. See RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN, & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION (1976).
209. See JOHN TAYLOR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 272-76 (Loren Baritz ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co.
1969); BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 60, 65 (William
Findley). The Council of Revision's converse fear-that a government would add
to its power through entanglement with intermediating institutions-is potent
in contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and is at the core of
Milovan Djilas's socialist critique of communism. MILOvAN DJiLAs, THE NEW
CLASS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMMuNIST SYSTEM (1957). However, few today
would argue mere state recognition of intermediating institutions is
tantamount to state entanglement.
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proceedings against Warren Hastings for abusing the power
of the East India Company.2 1 A few years later, in 1795, the
BNA and BUS were accused of forcing Philadelphia
merchants to support the Jay treaty by threatening to
withhold discounts.21" ' Shortly thereafter, the Bank of the
Manhattan Company was credited with engineering
Jefferson's victory in the 1800 Presidential election.2
But this fear of political corruption through
concentrated interest, although well articulated, was less
significant than the other fear of the Chester citizens: loss
of "that equality which ought to prevail in a commercial
country."21 This complaint reads simply enough: the BNA
was accused of playing favorites, by favoring specific
merchants and by refusing to satisfy the agricultural
demand for credit. The BNA's proponents fudged the first
charge, but could not deny the second charge.
But the BNA's opponents were not too concerned about
selective extension of credit, per se. The opponents of the
bank were proponents of a loan office that had only 50,000
pounds of credit to extend, and was supposed to extend this
credit in tranches of 25 to 100 pounds.214 This permitted
only between 500 and 2000 debtors statewide. Because
credit was allocated by county,1 5 there could be as few as
thirteen debtors in, say, Westmoreland County, which was
allocated only 1270 pounds.2 6 But the rather detailed
charter of the loan office prescribed no procedure whereby
this very scarce credit would be allocated!1 7 Fairness was
apparently not important if the connection with the state
were sufficiently intimate. Inequality, then, was not solely a
matter of favoritism in extension of credit, although
favoritism was an issue. By "equality," the BNA's opponents
210. See P.J. MARSHALL, THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS 22, 39-42
(1965).
211. See Letter from Pierce Butler to James Madison (Aug. 21, 1795), in 16
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 53, 54 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds., 1990)
[hereinafter MADISON PAPERS].
212. HAMMiOND, supra note 7, at 160.
213. LEWIS, supra note 30, at 56 n.1.
214. Stat. Pa. ch. 205, §§ 10 (1785).
215. Id. § 11.
216. Id.
217. See id. §§ 1-22.
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meant the political equality of citizens at least as much as
they meant equal access to credit.218
The real problem was the intermediate statal
connection of the bank. The opponents of the BNA did not
seem averse to private mercantile banking;219 the problem
was the state charter. Unchartered private banking was not
deemed a threat to equality. The state loan office could
grant credit to a subset of the creditworthy with neither due
process nor obloquy. Inequality became only problematic
with the intermediate statal nexus of the BNA. Equality is
threatened when the state delegates any of its powers to
less than everybody, as when it forms a political body that
is subordinate to, but independent of the state: the
imperium in imperio. (This concern persists today, and is
particularly apparent in discussions of the private
regulation of the Internet.22 °) Such an intermediating
218. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 65-67, 130 (William
Findley); id. at 14-15, 77 (Robert Lollar). The more frankly political committee
report has it as: even if Bank management were "confined to the hands of
Americans, it would be totally destructive of that equality which ought to
prevail in a republic." 2 PAINE, supra note 49, at 157 n.*. Robert Morris's
sarcastic summary of William Findley's argument says it all: "Equality is the
darling of our government-and the constitution says government is instituted
to preserve equal privileges, &c.-the bank, he says, cannot be common
amongst the citizens, and is therefore contrary to the constitution." BNA
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 88.
219. See, e.g., BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 114 (Robert
Whitehill), 74 (William Findley). The opponents of the BNA did not view free
chartering as an alternative. Indeed, the enemies of corporations were often as
opposed to free chartering as they were to limited chartering. See, e.g., HURST,
supra note 94, at 31-38; BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 114
(Robert Whitehill); TAYLOR, supra note 209, at 276; GOUGE, supra note 15, at
191. Some of this opposition to free chartering continued during and after the
triumph of the free chartering movement, due in large part to fears of
independent artisans at being proletarianized by incorporated factories. See,
e.g., Note, Incorporating the Republic: The Corporation in Antebellum Political
Culture, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1883, 1898 (1989). This particular strand of
corporophobia did not become particularly relevant to banks until much later,
because the nearly universal charter restriction on engaging in commerce
assured that banks would not (directly) disrupt established means of
production.
220. Much of this discomfort has focused on private regulation of the
Internet by Internet architecture: so-called "code." See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
AND OTBER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). The Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers ("ICANN)-organized as a nonprofit organization that
determines Internet domain name policy-is another area of concern. See, e.g.,
A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000). Both topics raise
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institution would seem particularly dangerous, in an era
when the predominant intermediating institutions-the
church and feudal lords-were identified with the
aristocratic old order supplanted by the Revolution.
Hence the concern with unfairness in credit allocation
by the bank, but not by individuals or the state.
Christopher Stone has argued that the public sector is
expected to display virtue- the private sector is merely
expected to obey the law."? The creators of the BNA loan
office thought that this virtue was easy: the state was
controlled by the people, and hence virtuous. But the people
did not control the Bank of North America. As chartered
collective economic activity, it was public, but with no
guarantees of virtue. Its charter did not sufficiently
regulate its activities, and compliance with the commercial
law of the day was simply insufficient.
It is not surprising that many opponents of the BNA
had a difficult time clearly articulating this grievance, or
other equality-linked grievances. The opposition to
corporations carried-and still carries-a lot of baggage,
and much of it has not been particularly logical.222 Even
Justice Brandeis used darkling language: "There was a
sense of some insidious menace inherent in large
the same old question in a new context: is great "private" power inherently
public? Whatever one's normative take on the issue, contemporary American
federal constitutional law has a clear answer: No. Paul Schiff Berman,
Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying
Constitutional Norms to "Private" Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263 (2000);
Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1194-1201
(2000). The great power and intermediate status of corporations was also a
significant issue at the turn of the previous century, resolved temporarily by the
organicist conception of the corporation. Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The
Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CmH. L. REV.
1441, 1447 & n.18, 1469-73 (1987).
221. See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues:
Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1494-1506
(1982); Gerald E. Frug, The City As a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057,
1131 (1980).
222. HURST, supra note 73, at 30-38. For examples, see infra text
accompanying note 235 (discussing agrarian argument that corporate profits
were akin to tax); NADER ET AL., supra note 208, at 17-32; Gordon S. Wood,
Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth
Century, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 401 (1982); text accompanying notes 250-53
(discussing Jefferson's corporophobia). On the other hand, it is not difficult to
find clear corporophobic thought apart from Findley's. See, e.g., BNA DEBATES




aggregations of capital, particularly when held by
corporations."223 This sense of menace was seldom carefully
articulated by the foes of corporations, and seemed beyond
the ken of the friends of corporations, such as Hamilton.
"Imagination appears to have been unusually busy
concerning it. An incorporation seems to have been
regarded as some great independent substantive thing; as a
political engine, and of peculiar magnitude and moment;
whereas it is truly to be considered as a quality, capacity, or
mean to an end."' 4
Fortunately, the March 1786 legislative debate on
rechartering the BNA (which resulted in a temporary
victory for the foes of the BNA) involved a noteworthy foe of
corporations-an articulate, precise, and radical thinker,
and a political heavyweight, to boot. 5 Although William
Findley became a friend of the Bank of the United States in
the nineteenth century,226 his 1786 attack on the business
corporation remains unrivalled for its clarity and precision:
Enormous wealth, possessed by individuals, has always had its
influence and danger in free states. Thus, even in Rome, where
patriotism seems to have pervaded every mind, and all her
measures to have been conducted with republican vigour, yet even
223. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
224. HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 97; cf. BNA DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 57 (Robert Morris, puzzled by the word
"equality"). As Maier has noted, many historians share this puzzlement. Maier,
supra note 89, at 66 n.43.
225. See, e.g., BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 86 (Robert
Morris), 100 (Thomas FitzSimons). Findley's historical importance goes well
beyond banking. For example, he invented the congressional committee system.
In the BNA debate alone he was credited by Gordon Wood with the first
legitimation of interest group politics, an act which Professor Wood considers
"maybe the crucial moment" in the history of American politics. WOOD, supra
note 50, at 256-58. Wood viewed the debate as a struggle between Morris and
Findley, with Findley attacking the hypocritical contrast between Morris's
disinterested rhetoric and his enormous personal stake in the BNA. Gordon
Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution, in
BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AIERICAN
NATIONAL IDENTITY 69, 93-100 (Beeman et al. eds., Chapel Hill 1987). For a
biography of Findley's earlier years, see JOHN CALDWELL, WILLIAM FINDLEY
FROM WEST OF THE MOUNTAINS: A POLITICIAN IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1783-1791
(2000).
226. HAMIOND, supra note 7, at 119 n.* ( William Findley... had been
prominent in the attack on the Bank of North America, but twenty-five years
later, in Congress, he was equally prominent in defense of the Bank of the
United States.").
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there, the patricians always had their clients-their dependents-
by the assistance of whom they often convulsed the counsels, and
distracted the operations of the state, and finally overturned the
government itself. But the Romans had no chartered institutions
for the sole purposes of gain. They chartered no banks.
Wealth in many hands operates as many checks: for in
numberless instances, one wealthy man has a control over
another. Every man in the disposal of his own wealth, will act
upon his own principles. His virtue, his honour, his sympathy, and
generosity, will influence his disposals and designs; and he is in a
state of personal responsibility. But when such an unlimited
institution is erected with such a capital, for the sole purpose of
increasing wealth, it must operate according to its principle; and
being in the hands of many, having only one point in view, and
being put in trust, the personal responsibility arising from the
principles of honour, generosity, &c. can have no place. The special
temper of the institution pervades all its operations: and thus, like
a snow ball perpetually rolled, it must continually increase its
dimensions and influence.
This institution having no principle but that of avarice, which
dries and shrivels up all the manly-all the generous feelings of
the human soul, will never be varied in its object: and, if
continued, will accomplish its end, viz. to engross all the wealth,
power and influence of the state.
The human soul is affected by wealth, in almost all its faculties.
It is affected by its present interest, by its expectations, and by its
fears. And must not, therefore, every thinking man see what
advantage this institution has on the human feelings, above that
of wealth held by many individuals? If our wealth is less equal
than our kind of government seems to require-and if agrarian
[i.e., redistributionist] laws are unjust in our present situation,
how absurd must it be for government to lend its special aid in so
partial a manner, to wealth, to give it that additional force and
spring, which it must derive from an almost unlimited charter?
Can any gentleman avoid seeing this to be eventually and
effectually overturning our government? Democracy must fall
before it. Wealth is its foundation, and gain its object and
design." 7
Findley's speech rests on two points. First, the fiduciary
principle implicit in the corporation is inhuman, and
socially destructive.2" Homo sapiens cannot be reduced to
227. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 65-66.
228. The Jacksonian editor of the Trenton Emporium and True American
captured the same idea in 1835. "To grasp all, and never voluntarily disgorge,
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homo economicus and remain fully human. Society can
tolerate businessmen acting as men pursuing wealth, but
cannot tolerate depersonalized rational profit-maximizers.
The business of America is not business alone. The
Revolutionary generation was obsessed with the ties that
bind society, and Findley was terrified of powerful bonds
less than human, at least if these bonds were not
governmental and legal. Abolishing the quasi-feudal
relations of rich and poor individuals may have been an
object of the American Revolution, but even these
relationships were better than the impersonal relationship
between an individual and a fiduciary. What could be worse
than vassalage to a dead hand? Vassalage to an invisible
hand?
Implicit in this is a sort of egalitarianism. Findley
wanted a polity of people and personal relations embedded
in one state, not a mixed polity of individual people and
embodied but impersonal economic interests, organized as
statelets. Worst of all would be a polity of organized
parastatal economic interests alone, the corporatist polity
dreaded a decade later by the New York Council of
Revisions:
If the legislature may mortgage, or, in other words, charter
away portions of either the privileges or powers of the state-if
they may incorporate bodies for the sole purpose of gain, with the
power of making bye-laws, and of enjoying the emolument of
privilege, profit, influence, or power,-and cannot disannul their
own deed, and restore to the citizens their right of equal
protection, power, privilege, and influence,-the consequence is,
that some foolish and wanton assembly may parcel out the
commonwealth into little aristocracies, and so overturn the nature
of our government without remedy.
2 3 0
are incident to [the] very nature [of corporations]." Corporate agents were
dehumanized by their agency: "with the nobler feelings and sentiments of men,
they have, in their capacity as agents, nothing to do." Emporium and True
American, July 19, 1835, cited in JOHN W. CADMAN, THE CORPORATION IN NEW
JERSEY: BUsINESS AND POLITICS 78 (1949).
229. See WOOD, supra note 50, at 215-18.
230. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 65 (William
Findley). This metaphor could be inverted. A corporation could be a "minor
republic," just as easily as it could be a "little aristocracy." WOOD, supra note 50,
at 337 (quoting Samuel Blodget); Maier, supra note 89, at 62. The taxonomy of
corporations was blurry in the 1780s, and the delegated powers of municipal
corporations which we now consider indubitably "statal" (e.g. taxation) were not
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There may be nothing wrong with the pursuit of wealth
or a reasonable amount of commerce,... but it must be a
democratic commerce of equal individuals, who-unlike
corporations-neither enjoy delegated statal powers, nor
can be reduced as fiduciaries to their commercial role.
Second, Findley subscribed to a more straightforward
egalitarianism. He insisted that inequality of wealth,
although perhaps unavoidable, subverts the political
equality of citizens."2 The effects of inequality are amplified
by increasing concentrations of wealth. Both inequality and
concentration are caused, in part, by corporations. Some
inequality might be unavoidable, but the inequality
resulting from corporations can be avoided with little cost.
Redistributionist laws may be unjust,"3 as may interference
with the associational rights of merchants, but it is easy to
just say no to corporate charters.
Any state-sanctioned device for agglomerating wealth
would be open to charges of soullessness and fomenting
inequality. But there was one acceptable form of collective
economic action-the state itself.234 All of the BNA
opponents were well disposed towards the state loan
office-indeed, their opposition to the BNA was largely
predicated on the BNA's antipathy to state money. A
common agrarian argument for loan offices was that the
profit accrued to the state-like a tax-whereas the profit of
banks accrued to its shareholders. Shareholders thus had
arrogated the power to tax! 5 The logical lacuna of this
readily distinguished from the other powers granted to business corporations.
HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AhIERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 86 (1983); HORWITz,
supra note 89, at 112.
231. See BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 128 (William
Findley); TAYLOR, supra note 209, at 282. But maybe too much property is a
problem. In a later debate, Findley blamed England's lack of republican virtue
on its commerce, and contrasted England with the republican, if uncommercial,
Switzerland. Rappaport, supra note 5, at 220-21.
232. See also BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 126
(William Findley).
233. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 122 (William
Findley); TAYLOR, supra note 209, at 285-86, 288-89 (love of property is justly at
root of society).
234. The central economic role of the state is stressed in FRANK BOURGIN,
THE GREAT CHALLENGE: THE MYTH OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC
(1989).
235. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 24 (John Smilie);
TAYLOR, supra note 209, at 259-69.
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argument is quite instructive. Agrarians did not assert that
unincorporated individuals' profits are taxes, nor the profits
of partnerships. Nor did they distinguish any relevant
differences between corporate and partnership profits, that
would make one a tax and the other a legitimate profit. The
intermediate statal connection was enough.
But the 1780s business corporation was even more
offensive, if that seems possible. The corporate device-if
not its function-smacked of medieval times, of feudalism
and church. In England, business corporations were fairly
insignificant (except for the Bank of England),36 and
corporations had been associated with ecclesiastical
organization. The revolutionary ex-colonists had not
forgotten this.
After a patient trial of charter privilege and monopoly for three
thousand years, almost at the moment they are rejected as poison
to civil and religious liberty, we are told that they are wholesome
aliment for commerce....
... It is not a new experiment, therefore, which we are trying. It is
only charter and state instead of church and state.
The Revolution created a new polity of individual,
equal, rights-bearing citizens. The very idea of a
corporation seemed reactionary, standing for the old polity
of powerful intermediating organizations consisting this
time of lords of stock, rather than lords of land or church. A
citizen could no more hope to be equal to a stockholder than
236. Stewart Kyd wrote the first corporation law treatise in 1793. This
English treatise barely mentioned business corporations at all, classifying them
as a subspecies of civil corporations, which in turn was a member of the genus
"lay corporation." The other subspecies of civil corporation contemplated by Kyd
was the eleemosynary corporation. Lay corporations, in turn, excluded
ecclesiastical corporations. 1 KYD, supra note 134, at 28-29. The substantive law
of all of these corporations was remarkably similar. Samuel Williston, History of
the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 105-06
(1888).
237. TAYLOR, supra note 209, at 281-82; see also HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra
note 2, at 55 ("We have... perpetual debt; I hope we shall not make a
perpetual corporation. What was it drove our forefathers to this country? Was it
not the ecclesiastical corporations, and perpetual monopolies of England and
Scotland?") (Rep. James Jackson of Georgia, during the BUS chartering debate
of 1791); BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 65, 123 (William
Findley, casting a feudalistic tone on corporations), 22 (John Smilie, making a
similar argument).
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he could hope to be equal to a lord or bishop. This was true
regardless of the ready transferability of stock. "[N]one but
men of wealth have money to be bankers."23 And beside, an
intermediating institution is more than the sum of its
individual shareholders.
The feudalistic air of the corporation was forgotten after
the Jacksonian era, although most of the other strands of
corporophobia remain intact today, at least for large
corporations. 239 But it is worth noting that the late
eighteenth-century corporation was a politically obtuse
device for agglomerating capital. Given the hieratic aroma
of the corporation, it is perhaps surprising that it succeeded
in competition with other forms, such as the joint-stock
company, business trust or limited partnership. It is even
more surprising that it succeeded in republican America
well before aristocratic England. The unique advantages of
a corporation over other devices-such as its permanent
governance relations, quasi-monopoly status and perhaps
limited liability-must have been strong to outweigh the
political disadvantages of the corporate form. But early
America did not have great concentrations of wealth, and
perhaps needed these advantages more than England.
But apart from feudalism, Findley still speaks today,
and the corporation still remains a live issue. Findley's
corporophobia is still with us, although the contemporary
animus is not against corporations as such, but against
large corporations.24 Justice Brandeis touched on this
238. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 74 (William
Findley).
239. See, e.g., NADER ET AL., supra note 208, at 7-9.
240. Contemporary corporophobia contains several strands not
contemplated in the Revolutionary era. For example, eighteenth-century
corporophobes were not particularly concerned about the relationship between
large businesses and their employees. An urban proletariat was not well
developed, and the agrarian opponents of corporations were not particularly
concerned with the plight of urban workers. Furthermore, the large banks
employed very few people. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 23. Although
the agrarian language remained, the Jacksonian opposition to corporations had
developed a far more proletarian flavor. See HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 493
(discussing the anti-bank stance of the urban Equal Rights party, also known as
the Loco Focos); Incorporating the Republic, supra note 219, at 1898-1902.
Protection of small business was a special case. This was a concern of both
corporophobes and corporophiles in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
century, and therefore effectively checked. The chartering policy of the time
kept the nascent corporations from competing with established lines of
business. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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animus in 1933, when he wrote his famous dissent in
Liggett v. Lee. Ralph Nader touches on many of the same
issues, and adds new specters, including: pollution,
discrimination, employee anomie, product safety, and power
over taste formation.1 But neither of these two lawyers has
been Findley's best twentieth-century voice. Nader and
Brandeis24 2 bound themselves by Hamiltonian utilitarian
language, which does not lend itself well to corporophobia.
Frank Capra's masterpiece, It's a Wonderful Life, is an
eerily close reflection of Findley's speech. Not only did
Capra seem to share Findley's corporophobia; the subject of
this film was banking.
This film is a tale of two individuals, identified with two
institutions: George Bailey, head of the Bailey Bros.
Building & Loan, and Henry Potter, identified with a
commercial bank. George Bailey himself was a good family
man, a man of "virtue, honor, sympathy and generosity,"
who felt a sense of "personal responsibility" for the
depositors and mortgagees of Bedford Falls. Economic
relations were personal. To stop a run on his bank, George
Bailey spoke to his panicky depositors, unpacking the
balance sheet of his bank into a set of helping relations
between individuals. The bank run ceased when Bailey had
repersonalized the relationships, going so far as to help
depositors with his own honeymoon money. When George
Bailey gave a mortgage, he was also giving a gift, a gift that
gently bound the mortgagee in a chain of community. "Our
laws and habits countenance long credits, and afford slow
methods for recovering debts. 243
241. NADER ET AL., supra note 208, at 17-32. It may be worth noting that
Findley's bill of particulars was far more rationally constructed than Nader's.
Nader views small corporations far more kindly than large corporations, even
though small corporations seem no less likely-per unit capitalization-to
pollute, discriminate, or produce unsafe products than large corporations.
(Indeed, small corporations are permitted to discriminate! 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1994)). Nader does not appear to place disproportionate emphasis on employee
anomie or the power of large corporations over taste formation, both of which
may be related to corporate size, rather than mere corporateness.
242. This reference to Brandeis is not to his scholarly opinion in Liggett v.
Lee; it is to his anti-bank polemic. See LouIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY (Stokes 1914).
243. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 65 (William
Findley). The deposits at the Bailey Brothers Building and Loan were not
demand deposits, but were rather on sixty-day call. Henry Potter generated the
run on Bailey Brothers by offering ready cash for assignment of the deposits, at
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But old Mr. Potter had no friends, no family, no
background. Mr. Potter was not human; he existed in no
social context but fiduciary to his investment portfolio. He
had "no principle but that of avarice, which dries and
shrivels up all the manly-all the generous feelings of the
human soul."2" Mr. Potter being an inhuman fiduciary, "the
personal responsibility arising from the principles of
honour, generosity, &c. can have no place."245 Mr. Potter, in
short, was a walking corporation-who owned a bank.
Findley's nightmare stopped with the displacement of
the State by the corporation. He could articulate the
corporation's challenge to the State, but could at best only
sense the corporation's threat to a community of
individuals. Capra went the next step, depicting in detail
the sort of society that would emerge when the corporation
was triumphant over the individual. George Bailey's angel
had the power to create a world without George Baileys,
dominated by the impersonal economics of Mr. Potter. It
was a world without social glue, of pure market relations. It
was a world of individual vice and moral rot, a world of gin
mills and broken families, with no responsibility outside of
the inhuman fiduciary relationship to the corporation. The
individual, presumably without the aid of an independent
State (Bedford Falls was renamed "Pottersville"), would
decay in the soulless society wrought by the impersonal
corporation.
Findley and Capra appear to be part of a continuous
tradition. Consider William Leggett, the Jacksonian
journalist:
We are no enemy to a free and natural system of credit between
man and man, the result of mutual confidence, the exercise of one
of the kindliest attributes of our nature, without which the frame
of society would fall into individual fragments, and be utterly
destroyed. But we are an enemy to a monopoly [i.e., bank] credit
system .... Your monopoly credit system fosters the city, but it
ruins the country; it builds up lordly mansions for the keen-eyed
sons of trade, but it leaves to irremediable dilapidation the cabins
of the farmer and mechanick; it encourages luxury and profusion
a 50% discount. In Frank Capra's world, punctuality seems to be a root of evil.
IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (RKO Pictures 1946).





among the few, and spreads penury and vice among the many. It is
a demoralizing system. It makes the acquisition of sudden wealth
the prime object of general effort, and blunts the publick moral
sense as to the means of gain. 46
There are doubtless considerable differences between
1780s, Jacksonian and contemporary corporophobia.
However, the similarities are striking.
Corporophobia was amplified by the monopolistic
nature of early banking. It is fair to say that monopolies
were almost universally disliked in the 1780s. The problem
was in defining what a monopoly was. This term clearly had
two senses, a narrow legal sense and a broader political
one. The legal sense was clearly stated by Alexander
Hamilton: "monopoly implies a legal impediment to the
carrying on the trade by other than to whom it is
granted.2 47 Such state-granted monopolies were clearly
offensive to any meaningful sense of equality.
But-except for the brief period between 1782 and
1783-banks did not enjoy such bald monopoly powers in
their charters. 24" But there was another sense of monopoly,
which did apply to the early banks. As usual, William
Findley said it best:
The institution is itself a monopoly-being incorporated a great
trading company-and having a right to turn ten millions of
dollars into trade, if the president and directors please-or to lay
out that amount upon land. So, by taking advantage of a scarcity
of money, which they have it so much in their power to occasion,
they may become sole lords of the soil. If they may monopolize
246. WILLIAM LEGGETT, DEMOCRATICK EDITORIALS: ESSAYS IN JACKSONIAN
POLITICAL ECONOMY 173 (Lawrence H. White ed., 1984).
247. HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 101 (Hamilton's opinion to the
President on the constitutionality of the First BUS). In a mild historical irony,
the meaning of illegal monopoly has been reversed with time. In the 1780s,
monopoly implied state action. Contemporary antitrust laws regulate the
independent actions of corporations, but absolve most state actions of
monopolistic stigma.
248. Formal monopoly power first came to banking in 1799, when the first
"restraining act" was adopted. The restraining acts forbade the emission of
paper money by anybody but a chartered bank. However, they are not relevant
to this discussion, because they were not present before 1799, and not common
until around 1814. See infra note 338 and accompanying text. The charters of
the Banks of the United States did not permit federal charter of another bank,
but state competition was presumed. 1 BANKING & CURRENCY, supra note 63, at
307-14 (First BUS), 460-76 (Second BUS).
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trade-if they may monopolize the soil-why not the government
too? Doubtless they may.
I do not say whether or no the bank is a monopoly in the strict
legal sense of the word. This is not to my purpose. But I say that it
is, in its nature and principles, in the common popular sense a
monopoly: and being so in its nature, it must be so in its effects.
The 1780s banks were indeed monopolies, in Findley's
sense, if not Hamilton's. The fear of "turn[ing] ten millions
of dollars into trade" was real even among the merchants-
real enough to engender by-laws and subsequently charter
restrictions. Formally, the charter was far short of a legal
bar on competition. But as a practical bar on effective
competition, it was frightening enough.
Findley's clear thought was unusual among his
contemporary corporophobes. Indeed, unvarnished
corporophobia could seem nearly paranoid. The paranoia
may have been further fuelled by the mysterious nature of
banking. Not only was banking economically ill understood,
but its day-to-day operations were shrouded in secrecy. The
secretive collective decisionmaking of early banks was
sufficiently conspiratorial to bring out a paranoid streak in
their critics.25
Corporophobia could dull the brain of no less than
Thomas Jefferson, as evidenced in his 1791 report to
President Washington on the Constitutionality of the First
Bank of the United States. Most of the other opponents of
the measure, including Madison and Edmund Randolph,
made perfectly sound legal arguments predicated on the
limited scope of implied powers in the Constitution. Not so
Jefferson. His report began with the Corporation, not the
Constitution:
The bill for establishing a national bank undertakes, among
other things,
1.To form the subscribers into a corporation.
249. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 69 (William
Findley); see also id. at 125 (William Findley).
250. See id. at 73 (William Findley); see also GRAS, supra note 19, at 14;
Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, supra note 2 at 27 (also excerpted supra
text accompanying note 171). Eighteenth-century Americans were very
sensitive to conspiracies, real or imagined. See generally Wood, supra note 222.
On the collective decisionmaking by early banks' directors, see 1 REDLICH, supra
note 18, at 17-20, 55-64.
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2.To enable them, in their corporate capacities, to receive grants
of land; and so far is against the laws of mortmain.
3.To make alien subscribers capable of holding lands; and so far
is against the laws of alienage.
4.To transmit these lands, on the death of a proprietor, to a
certain line of successors; and so far changes the course of
descents.
5.To put the lands out of the reach of forfeiture or escheat; and
so far is against the laws of forfeiture and escheat.
6.To transmit personal chattels to successors, in a certain line;
and so far is against the laws of distribution.
7.To give them the sole and exclusive right of banking under the
national authority; and so far is against the law of monopoly.
8.To communicate to them a power to make laws paramount to
the laws of the States; for so they must be construed, to protect the
institution from the control of the State Legislatures; and so,
probably, they will be construed.
2 5 1
Jefferson then dropped his attack on corporations and
jumped to a more conventional Constitutional argument
from the limited powers of Congress, similar to Randolph's
and Madison's. Near the end of his opinion he finally
referred back to the preface, stating that it was outside the
intent of the Constitution that "Congress should be
authorized to break down the most ancient and
fundamental laws of the several States, such as those
against mortmain, the laws against alienage, the rules of
descent, the acts of distribution, the laws of escheat and
forfeiture, [and] the laws of monopoly[.]" 212 This was a very
weak legal move by the standards of its time. The legal
issue was Congressional authority; not State prerogative.
The Supremacy Clause clearly contemplated that valid
Federal law would trump contrary state law. Furthermore,
the tradition of Parliamentary sovereignty over common
law was very strong in the late eighteenth century.5 3
251. HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 91 (Thomas Jefferson) (footnote
omitted); see also id. at 86-89 (Attorney General Edmund Randolph's anti-bank
opinion on constitutionality); id. at 40-44, 82-84 (Madison's legal objections in
his House of Representatives speeches).
252. Id. at 93 (Thomas Jefferson).
253. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 306 (J. Cooke ed., 1961) (James Madison)
(on Supremacy Clause); see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
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Jefferson's opinion was not only bad law, it was bad
rhetoric. No good advocate (and Jefferson was good enough
to have written the Declaration of Independence) would
lead off with a fragment of an unconventional argument,
switch to a strong argument, and finish up with the rest of
the unconventional argument. Jefferson was arguing from
his heart, not his head.
3. Results of Combat. Although the 1786 debate ended
in defeat of the pro-bank faction's proposal to restore the old
charter, there were some signs of compromise. Paine, in his
pro-bank polemic, agreed with the anti-bank force's
objections to the unlimited charter of the bank, had no
objection to a restriction in land holding, and approved
(albeit without much reasoning) the Bank of England's
restriction on trading activities.254 But even the radicals
hinted that there might have been room for compromise.
Smiley, a key bank opponent, hinted that the problem with
the bank may be more in its high capital, unlimited powers,
and close control than in its existence, and excoriated the
Bank's proponents for demanding restoration of the old
charter rather than a compromise. 5' Whitehill, another
bank enemy, said that one of the problems with the bank
was its lack of rotation.256 Smilie also called for regressive
voting."' In later life, William Findley claimed that his
objections to the bank were its size and perpetual lifetime,
not its existence.25 (This claim is not borne out by his record
at the 1786 debates, although Findley did acknowledge the
next year that a bank that did not interfere with
government might be acceptable.)
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885, 916-17 (1985).
Jefferson's resort to the Framers' deliberations was also an unusual move by
contemporaneous legal conventions, which looked to the language of the
statute, rather than the legislative history. Id. at 915 n.153.
254. PAINE, supra note 49, at 164-65, 185.
255. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 112 (John Smilie).
Robert Lollar also attacked bank governance, as much as its existence. See id.
at 76 (Robert Lollar).
256. Id. at 60-61 (Robert Whitehill).
257. Id. at 109 (John Smilie).
258. On Findley's subsequent recollections, see Letter from William Findley
to William Plumer (Feb. 27, 1812), in PA. MAG. HIST. & Bio. 440, 444 (1881);
HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 216, 462-63 (discussing Findley's remarks
during the Congressional debate to renew the bank's charter); see also
Proceedings of the General Assembly, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Mar. 20, 1787.
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Whether or not these Assembly members were sincere
is open to discussion.259 Yet not all opponents of the original
BNA charter wanted its death, or were even agrarians. We
have just discussed Thomas Paine, but he was by no means
alone. Tench Coxe, a Philadelphia merchant who later
helped Hamilton launch the BUS, opposed the BNA as it
was then constituted, but was a strong supporter of a
limited bank. He was particularly concerned with the BNA
charter's lack of regressive voting, and much of his
argument concerned this one issue. He argued that neither
private partnerships nor the Bank of England had voting
rules commensurate with wealth. He also argued from the
equality concerns of the time: that civil government treated
all voters equally, regardless of their wealth, and corporate
voting should be similar. Coxe had been active in
organizing the abortive Bank of Pennsylvania in 1784, and
had penned a charter whose chief distinctions from the
BNA charter were regressive voting and state inspection.
His dislike of banks run by a small group of large
shareholders arose from personal experience. Although a
BNA shareholder, he was not one of the major insiders, and
perhaps resented the insiders' total control of the bank.6"
Coxe also proposed rotation, limited individual
shareholdings, and exclusion of foreign shareholders.26' His
argument for these provisions was largely from the
precedent of the Bank of England, and less from personal
experience, or independently articulated policy concerns. He
also briefly mentioned trade restrictions:
259. For example, at the end of the debate, a bank proponent named John
Hannum unsuccessfully sought to amend the resolution on the table to provide
for a more restricted charter. This motion lost by about the same margin as the
proposal to restore the charter (Yeas-Nays, 30-39 vs. 28-41, respectively). BNA
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 131. At the time, the opponents of
the BNA seemed much keener on abolition than reform.
260. Rappaport also notes that bank proponents seemed split into two
factions, with Tench Coxe playing a prominent role in the more "moderate"
faction. Rappaport seems to view the moderates as possessing pro-bank
economic beliefs and anti-bank political beliefs, resulting in a compromise
position of support for a limited charter. Rappaport, supra note 5, at 211-15.
This may be true (Coxe became a pro-business Jeffersonian in the 1790s), but
the behavior of Coxe and others is also explicable in terms of micropolitics: as a
struggle between insider supporters of Morris's autocratic internal governance
of the Bank and outsider proponents of a less centralized internal governance
scheme.
261. Coxe Family Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Ser. 3, Reel
111 (Dec. 6, 1786).
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The bank of England was likewise restrained from trading any
thing, but bills of exchange or bullion, but the charter from the
Assembly of Pennsylvania did not prohibit a trade in any thingwhatever. 262
He did not discuss land holdings nor provide any
further rationale for trade restrictions; indeed, none may
have occurred to him. Apart from his independently
reasoned stance on regressive voting, Coxe seemed an
uncritical admirer of the Bank of England charter.
Or consider John Chaloner, Alexander Hamilton's
business correspondent in Philadelphia. Chaloner was a
more restrained admirer of the Bank of England than Coxe,
but signed a petition, probably penned by Coxe, seeking to
make the rechartered BNA resemble the Bank of England.
Writing to Hamilton:
I believe if adopted it [the new charter] will so effectually remove
the Jealousy and apprehension of Government as no longer to
Cause the Bank to be an object of their Resentment; which was
solely occasioned by the influence a few people had among the
Stockholders to allways nominate and Elect the directors: and by
their Continuing to sit as Directors did in a great measure
influence and Comand the Trade of the City and give a bias to all
Elections for assembly or other purposes.
The merchants wanted a bank, but were not all happy
with Robert Morris' bank. In its struggle for survival, the
BNA had shown its full political power, and Morris his full
political control over the Bank. This changed the tenor of
the 1787 debate considerably. Gone was the Findley's
theoretical corporophobia of 1786. In the 1787 rechartering
debate, the power of the bank and its dominance by Morris
was a major concern of all.
262. Id.
263. Letter from John Chaloner to Alexander Hamilton (Dec. 16, 1786), in 3
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 699-700; see also JACOB COOKE, TENCH
COXE AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC 91 n.29 (1978) (attributing petition to Coxe). As
for Chaloner's "bias to all Elections" remark, it should be noted that Morris and
two associates stood for election to the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1785,
apparently to protect the Bank. Rappaport, supra note 5, at 153. Their election,
and the motives behind it, was a major theme of the March 1786 debate. BNA




See him [Robert Morris] converting a bank, instituted for common
benefit, to his own and creatures emolument, and by the aid
thereof, controuling the credit of the state, and dictating the
measures of government. View the vassalage of our merchants, the
thraldom of the city of Philadelphia, and the extinction of that
spirit of independency in most of its citizens so essential to
freedom.
264
As this opponent of the bank saw it, the most
prominent person associated with the bank turned it into a
private piggybank, destroyed the credit of state paper, and
made citizens excessively dependent on the bank. But at
least the first and third of these criticisms, unlike those of
1785-86, were compatible with the existence of banks.
A new election to the Assembly returned a pro-bank
majority, and a committee of the Assembly proposed that a
new charter be issued, although limited in capital, lifetime
and addressing other "reasonable grounds of objection."269
By December 13, 1786, the Assembly had adopted the
committee's report, although not without debate. 266 The
debate was largely a rehash of the earlier debate, with
Morris and Findley continuing to play the key roles.
(Smilie, the other leader of the anti-bank forces, was not
reelected.) Findley theorized less about equality, and
concentrated more on the ability of the Bank to suborn the
State.67
The result was a compromise, limiting capital and
lifetime, but not affecting bank governance or operations.
Despite these apparently good terms, Robert Morris and
some other bank insiders were uneasy with anything short
of restoration of the old charter. There are several possible
reasons for this. An amended charter could possibly permit
shareholders to depart from the bank. Perhaps Morris
genuinely believed in Paine's and Wilson's arguments that
charter revocation was tyrannous, or perhaps he was afraid
that only an irrevocable charter would ensure that he
264. 2 HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 178-79 (1981)
(Letter from the "Centinel" to the People of Pennsylvania, Dec. 29, 1787).
265. FREEMEN'S J. (Philadelphia), Dec. 6, 1786; Proceedings of the General
Assembly, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Dec. 14, 1786.
266. See Proceedings of the General Assembly, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Dec.
14, 1786.
267. See Proceedings of the General Assembly, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Dec.
25-27, 1786 (recounting the debates in the General Assembly on Dec. 13, 1786).
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remained in control of the Bank.2" However, other major
bank figures, such as FitzSimons, were happy with a
compromise that permitted the BNA to operate as it had
been doing.269
The charter debate in March, 1787 which ratified the
December actions was intellectually far thinner than the
March, 1786 debate, but perhaps politically richer. Most
speeches of opposition to the bank discussed the political
muscle it had shown; corporophobia was largely absent. But
the 1787 debate featured genuine disagreements among the
bank proponents, reflecting the struggle between Morris'
insider faction and the outsider merchants who wanted a
more accommodating utility. The bill was enacted clause-
by-clause.27 The first clause, specifying the life of the
charter, was blank in the bill.1 A proposal for a twenty-one
year life was defeated forty to twenty-six, but a fourteen
year life won, thirty-five to thirty.27 Even many of the
proponents of the bank were afraid of too powerful an
institution. Most of the other clauses passed by a similar
majority, although Findley managed to defeat a charter
clause punishing embezzlement with death.27 (Robert
Morris seconded Findley's motion.) Whitehill, a bitter
opponent of the bank, sought to permit shareholders to
withdraw their stock; this amendment was defeated.274
More significantly, George Logan sought to restrain
shareholders to one vote each.275 This proposal also lost,
after the bank proponents explained that the BNA already
had a by-law limiting shareholders to twenty votes. 6 Logan
was no blind enemy of the bank; he had voted to restore the
268. See Proceedings of the General Assembly, in PENNSYLVANIA PACKET,
Dec. 25, 1786 (Robert Morris addressing Assembly on Dec. 13, 1786).
269. Letter from John Chaloner to Alexander Hamilton, (Dec. 13, 1786) in 3
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 698; LEWIS, supra note 30, at 73; see also
Proceedings of the General Assembly, PENNSYLVANIA PAcKET, Dec. 25, 1786
(Robert Morris and Thomas FitzSimons addressing Assembly on Dec. 13, 1786).
270. Proceedings of the General Assembly, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Mar. 20,
1787. See generally Wilson, supra note 131, at 26-28 (discussing the overall
atmosphere of the debate).









charter in 1786. But Morris's autocratic rule had changed
his mind. The George Logan who voted for incorporated
banking in both April and December of 1786 voted against
Morris's piggybank in 1787.7 But the bank was finally
rechartered, on new terms, by a thirty-five to thirty-one
vote."8 The restrictions on land holding and trade were
never mentioned in the March 1787 debate, but were
mentioned at least once in the December 1786 debate.
Findley expressed some fear that the BNA would snap up
the land that Pennsylvania was about to sell.28 This was a
demagogic move; it had already been made abundantly
clear in previous debates and pamphleteering-as well as
BNA practice-that the BNA was not interested in land
acquisition."'
The bank kept its preferred mode of governance, and
did not introduce regressive voting or rotation into the
charter, although regressive voting was already in the
BNA's by-laws."2 The bank surrendered the right to keep
its by-laws secret. This surrender was not of central
significance, although it may have served to crystallize the
regressive voting provisions present in the more flexible
secret by-laws. The only things that the BNA may have
valued that it surrendered were unlimited life and
effectively unlimited capital. But even here, it received a
reasonable bargain. The opponents of the bank had argued
that the bank charter should last no longer than the
state's-seven years.283 But the new BNA charter was good
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Rappaport, supra note 5, at 220.
280. Proceedings of the General Assembly, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Dec. 25,
1786.
281. See supra text accompanying note 149 (BNA by-laws); supra text
accompanying note 254 (bank-apologist Paine expressing no opposition to land
restrictions); HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 75-76 (discussing mercantile bank
assets).
282. Morris was a strong partisan of the status quo in governance. BNA
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 117 (Robert Morris). However, his
ruling faction of the Bank conceded regressive voting for directors through the
by-laws in 1784, as part of the movement to open the Bank. Originally, the by-
laws themselves were subject to straight per-share voting, but by the end of
1790, they too were subject to regressive voting. See 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra
note 17, at 281 n.139 (discussing hand-written note by Morris on Hamilton's
draft Report on the Bank).
283. BNA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 65 (William
Findley).
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for fourteen years. The authorized capital of the new BNA
was $2 million, more than twice the actual BNA capital at
the time of the 1786 debate.2
The new prohibitions on bank powers were strongly
written, but-being already standard business practice-
were cheap for the Bank to provide. The restriction on land-
holding power was quite strong, for its time. The bank was
forbidden to acquire land, except that necessary for
conducting the business of the bank or land acquired
through debt foreclosure. In contrast, neither the Maryland
nor Providence Bank charters had land prohibitions. The
1784 Massachusetts bank charter limited land holding to
50,000 pounds, but had no restriction on the purposes or
means of acquisition. (Most subsequent land restrictions
resembled the BNA's, which was copied from the Bank of
England's). The restriction on land holding does not appear
to be related to the governance of the early banks.
Merchants may have been land speculators, but there is no
evidence that merchants feared bank competition in this
field. For their own safety, mercantile banks avoided landed
assets in particular, and illiquid assets in general.
The prohibition on landowning, then, ratified existing
business practices. It did not prevent the BNA from
becoming a landed institution; it merely restricted the
means by which the BNA could acquire land. At most, the
BNA charter restriction may have prevented it from
becoming a dealer in land, but did little to prevent it from
accumulating land. (The opponents of banks did not miss
this distinction.)285 It was BNA operations, not the BNA
charter, which kept it out of the real estate business.
It is possible to justify the land-holding restrictions as
another governance measure. The prohibition on direct
purchase of land could serve as a prohibition on the bank's
purchasing land from a favored customer on generous
terms. This could be far more detrimental to a bank than
insider discounts. Such an explanation, although logically
tenable, seems strained. The land-holding restrictions were
most likely a sop to the corporophobes, a mortmain law for
banks. If United States banking corporations were
reminiscent of English religious corporations, the same
284. During the debate, Morris stated that the Bank's capital was $870,400.
Id. at 94 (Robert Morris).
285. HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 74 (William Branch Giles).
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remedial provision could be applied to both. It made little
difference whether it remediated anything. For political
peace, the bankers were willing to make a partial surrender
of a power not particularly desired.
Although the language of the land-holding restrictions
of the BNA was copied from the charter of the Bank of
England, the provenance of the language was not
particularly significant. After all, the earlier charter of the
Massachusetts Bank also restricted land holding, albeit in a
far simpler (and more effective) fashion. Its resemblance to
the Bank of England charter may have been an attempt to
please Tench Coxe and his Anglophilic ilk, who had lost on
the far more important regressive voting issue.
One other charter limitation was present in the 1787
charter-a restriction on dealing in merchandise, except
goods acquired as security, bullion, and produce from the
bank's lands. This restriction was slavishly copied from the
original 1694 charter of the Bank of England, with a few
changes in spelling and punctuation, and a few other
changes that reflected structural differences between the
British Crown and the republican government of
Pennsylvania.286 It may have been adopted uncritically, as
another inexpensive sop to critics of the Bank. It is unlikely
that bank safety was a consideration. No American source
of which I am aware discussed the prohibition on trade as a
means of assuring bank safety.
To the extent that it had a purpose, the BNA charter
prohibition on merchandise probably had the same purpose
as the Bank of England restriction-to protect established
merchants from competition from the nascent Bank."7 In
286. The BNA recharter even cribbed the 1694 Bank of England's
prohibition of "wager of law." This truly medieval legal device permitted the
defendant to take an oath and recruit eleven oath-helpers to solemnly confirm
the oath. If this ordeal was properly performed, the defendant immediately won
the trial. Although this bizarre practice was not formally abolished in England
until 1833, it had become functionally obsolete by 1602 in most cases. See F.W.
MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw 14-17 (A.H. Chaytor & W. J.
Whittaker eds., 1962).
287. The Bank of England charter language contained an explanatory
preface:
And to the intent that theire Majesties subjects may not be oppressed
by the said corporation by theire monopolizing or ingrosseing any sort
of goods, wares, or merchandizes be it further declared.., that the
said corporation... shall not att any time... deale or trade.., in the
buying or selling of any goods, wares, or merchandizes whatsoever ....
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the December, 1786 debates over the Bank, one
pamphleteer discussed the powers restrictions as ensuring
that the Bank would not "injure the private commerce of
the country."2"8 Findley, of course, had discussed the latent
commercial powers of the old bank as a possible source of
monopoly."8 9  As discussed above, exactly the same
considerations were present at the chartering of almost all
the early merchants' banks. Similar-albeit very differently
worded-protective clauses could be found in two other
early charters, those of The Bank of New York and The
Massachusetts Bank.
But the remarkable thing about the 1787 charter was
how insignificant the charter restrictions on land and
commerce were. The big issues were lifetime, capital, and
regressive voting. The land and commerce restrictions
seemed to be surrenders of things not much wanted by
bankers. The foes of banks did not get much for these
surrenders: some abatement of Findley's corporophobia, a
sop to Coxe's outsider merchants, and a small dose of the
Bank of England's legitimacy. The lifetime and capital
restrictions were far more significant defeats for the BNA;
5 & 6 W. & M., c. 20, § 26 (1694) (Eng.); see also Bernard Shull, The Separation
of Banking and Commerce: Origin, Development, and Implications for Antitrust,
28 ANTITRUST BULL. 255, 262 (1983). One of the few contemporary English
explanations of this charter prohibition reads:
[An incorporated bank's] business is to keep the cash of traders, or
others, to deal in bullion, exchanges, and discounts, and to lend upon
securities, but upon none but such as are morally certain, and for short
time of payment; or which, upon occasion, may be readily exchanged
again for money: on the contrary, that such a bank ought never to
purchase or lend money upon lands, as well because of the hazards of
titles, as of the tediousness and uncertainty of repayments: least of all
should a bank deal in merchandize, because of the risque of
adventuring, the dubiousness of profits, and the length of time for
returns: it ought, indeed to be always strictly restrained from the
buying and selling merchantable commodities, by reason of the great
injury which might thereby arise to trade in general, from an
uncontroulable monopoly.
POSTLETMVAYTE, supra note 19 (under dictionary entry for "Banking"). Even
Postlethwayte, perhaps the only commentator who perceived any business risk
in bank mercantile activities, seemed far more concerned about disruption of
established business relationships and the risks of land banking, devoting
almost one and a half folio pages to the subject. Id.
288. Thoughts Concerning the Bank, PENNSYLVANIA PACKET, Dec. 20, 1786
(commonly attributed to Tench Coxe).
289. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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the exclusion of regressive voting in the charter a far more
significant defeat for the outsiders.
B. The First Bank of the United States
The First Bank of the United States-chartered in
1791-was the fourth chartered bank in the United States.
In many ways, it was a typical early bank of the time; the
idea of a "central bank" had not yet been invented.9 ' But
the First BUS was special in three key ways. First, the BUS
was a national bank. This meant that it was far bigger than
other banks, providing services on a national scale. It was
thus more frightening, and politically charged. Second,
national politics was different. Consistent with Madison's
Federalist No. 10, the national BUS was no work of a small
clique. To be sure, regional conflict was pronounced, and
noted by the participants.29' However, there was little
personal or idiosyncratic about the politics of the BUS.
Finally, as we shall see below, the BUS was a merchants'
utility in operations only-its ends were public.
Because the BUS was a national bank, large and
prestigious, its charter had a strong effect on subsequent
ones. The pre-BUS charters were idiosyncratic and
experimental. The BUS charter was also experimental, but
it was not idiosyncratic for long. It became the template on
which future bank charters were constructed. Future
charters in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century
might differ from the First BUS charter on significant
points, but still they tended to generally resemble the First
BUS charter.
After the adoption of the BUS charter, resemblances
between the BUS charter and subsequent charters can be
attributed to conservatism, rather than conscious choice.
There was much less charter evolution in the chartering
orgy of 1792-1800 than during the preceding decade.
290. See TIMBERLAKE, supra note 78, at 4. There is no indication that the
First BUS was intended to govern other banks' currency. In contrast, the
drafters of the Second BUS charter were clearly aware that the Bank would
stabilize the currency. See, e.g., HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 630-34
(John Calhoun's Feb. 26, 1816 speech to the House of Representatives).
291. See, e.g., HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 56 (Robert Jackson).
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1. The First Public Bank. The First BUS was not only
a national bank, it was special in another way. Unlike other
banks at the time, it was not founded by and for merchants.
Calculated public policy dominated. The First BUS, then,
was similar to the 1781 BNA, but not similar to subsequent
and contemporary chartered banks-the BNA of 1784, the
Massachusetts Bank, and the Banks of Maryland, New
York, and Providence.
Alexander Hamilton proposed the Bank of the United
States to the First Congress in 1791. His report on the BUS
neglected its corporate character almost completely, and
discussed the bank as an instrumentality for creation of a
nonmetallic currency, a source of credit to the federal
government, and as fiscal agent for the Federal
government.293 Hamilton's strong emphasis on the Bank's
paper money cannot contrast more strongly with the
position of the BNA advocates in the 1786 debate. It also
reflects an apparent recent conversion on Hamilton's part.
In January 1790, Hamilton issued his Report on Public
Credit. This report barely mentioned a bank and discussed
it only as a means of stabilizing the value of the debt,
making securities a more effective money.294 However, even
in 1790, Hamilton knew that mercantile opinions on bank
notes were changing. On November 25, 1789, William
Bingham had sent Hamilton a letter suggesting an
expansion of the BNA, funded largely by government debt,
in large part to provide currency through the BNA's bank
notes. 5 The Report on a National Bank dropped all
mention of public securities as currency, possibly because
securities had become a politicized issue at the time.296
Private ownership was a means to a public purpose.
Private ownership was the only way to produce a stable
paper currency. The "stamping of paper is an operation so
much easier than the laying of taxes," that a government
would be tempted to debauch the currency, as did several
292. The BNA may have been born "public," cf. Riesman, supra note 81, at
35-42 (discussing some of the "public" considerations behind the creation of the
BNA), but may have become "private" with almost its first breath, and was
certainly "private" by 1784. See generally supra Part I.B.
293. Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 15, 16-18.
294. 7 HAIILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 70, 108.
295. 5 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 551-54.
296. See generally infra Section II.B.3 (discussing Hamilton's Report on a
National Bank and its treatment of the public securities issue).
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state governments under the Articles of Confederation.297
Private enterprise, driven by the profit motive and
disciplined by fear of loss, was needed to ensure
responsibility. A privately owned bank would more easily
raise the required funds than a governmental bank;
merchants had better credit than the nascent Republic. But
a partnership or a joint-stock company would not do. A
corporate charter was needed to ensure government control
over the goals of the bank.
Finally, Hamilton was aware that the private banks,
seeking to optimize their return, would only open up their
subscriptions for a limited amount of capital. A small bank
would not only encourage accusations of favoritism in
discounts, it would not be an efficient means of issuing
currency. The BUS's large mandatory capital was, in itself,
a public feature.
Hamilton's opponents, unsurprisingly, took the opposite
tack. James Madison stuck chiefly to the constitutional
issues. But when he discussed the merits of the BUS, he
chose to list the advantages of the bank as primarily
mercantile, rather than public. Madison's rank ordering of
bank advantages was: improved mercantile financing
resulting in more business; improved mercantile financing
resulting in easier payment of customs duties; short- and
medium-term loans to government; diminishing usury;
physically,,preserving metallic currency; and facilitating
payments. Madison wished to characterize the BUS as
one of the "private" mercantile banks of its time: the BNA,
the still-unincorporated Bank of New York, and the
Massachusetts and Maryland Banks.
2. The Chartering Debate. The debate in the House of
Representatives was not dominated by banking, or even
(pace Jefferson) corporophobia, but rather by the bank's
Constitutionality. (Senate debate was secret.) The
Constitutional issue was genuine. The authority to charter
corporations was not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution. This exclusion could not be called inadvertent;
297. Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 24.
298. See HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 39. It is perhaps worth
noting that Madison, unlike the Philadelphia agrarians who fought the BNA,
was no friend of state emissions of paper. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 300-
01 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
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chartering power had been discussed in the debates over
the Constitution.99 (Not discussed was any particular policy
on banking, or the monetary policy of banks."0 ) Because the
power to incorporate banks had not been expressly granted
to Congress, (and indeed was contested by the ratifying
states), the power had to be implied, if it existed at all.
299. See HAMIOND, supra note 7, at 104-05. The framers, prompted by
James Madison, had debated whether to include chartering authority as a
power of Congress in the Post Road Clause. See Records of the Federal
Convention (Sept. 14, 1788), in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 75,
at 19. They decided not to put this question to a vote for two reasons. First, a
general grant of chartering authority would be construed as permitting a bank,
a result not desired in the commercial cities of Philadelphia and New York.
Second, charters were associated with the "mercantile monopolies" of the
British Crown. A third reason for not voting on special chartering was also
proffered by James Wilson (a defender of the BNA in 1785-86): that the
chartering power was already granted to Congress in the Commerce Clause. See
id. These objections limited the vote to specially chartered canal companies, but
this vote was defeated, with only the Post Office and Post Road Clause
remaining. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7
The question of chartering authority also arose in the Patent and Copyright
Clause, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, but in this context, the Framers were thinking of
chartering eleemosynary corporations, as opposed to the public-interest
business corporations contemplated in the Post Road Clause debates. Madison's
notes read:
To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited time
To establish an University
To encourage, by proper premiums and provisions, the advancement of
useful knowledge and discoveries
To establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts and
sciences
To grant charters of incorporation
To grant patents for useful inventions
To secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time
To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for the
promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures.
3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, at 40. The Patent and Copyright
Clause has further significance for early banking law. It clearly authorizes a
limited subset of federal monopolies. This might be taken to imply that other
monopolies (such as corporate charters) are forbidden by the Constitution.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. This logic was used in Andrew Jackson's
1832 message vetoing the renewal of the charter of the Second Bank of the
United States. See also TAYLOR, supra note 209, at 263 (discussing the
unconstitutionality of monopolies).
300. HAM MOND, supra note 7, at 106.
301. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina and Rhode Island
suggested in their ratifications of the Constitution that it be amended to
provide that no federal mercantile charters be granted bearing "exclusive
advantages of commerce." New York wanted to ban all monopoly grants. Such
amendments were suggested in the First Congress and in 1793, but to no avail.
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This Constitutional debate, therefore, concerned the scope
of Congress' implied powers. Although very important in its
own right, this issue is not particularly significant to this
study. The First BUS debate does far less to illuminate
early corporate law than the BNA debate.
James Madison, the chief opponent of the Bank in the
House, had a complex set of feelings towards the Bank. He
was primarily concerned with the Bank's constitutionality.
In 1781, he opposed the BNA for constitutional reasons
alone; he did not doubt that the public bank was wise on
the merits."0 2 Nor did he seem opposed to banks in the
summer of 1787. Quite the contrary. The BNA charter war
was barely over when the Federal Constitutional
convention began. At the Convention, Madison twice
suggested that Congress be empowered "to grant charters of
corporations in cases where the public good may require
them, and the authority of a single state may be
incompetent.""3 It is difficult to think of an interstate
business in 1787 that was not a bank, or perhaps a canal
company.
These constitutional concerns dominated Madison's
posture in the debate. Most of his reservations about
banking were remediable. He was most concerned by the
subscription procedures of the new Bank, which he viewed
as designed to transfer wealth to Northern securities
speculators. °4 But this was no objection to banking per se,
and indeed, Hamilton's subscription scheme was modified
in a supplementary act passed a week after the bank act
itself. Most of the other objections to the Bank in his speech
to the House were also remediable (including excessively
long lifetime, the Bank's power to lend to the federal
Simeon Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before 1786, 8 Ai. HIST. REV.
449, 464 (1903).
302. See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Jan. 8, 1782), in
4 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 211, at 22-23.
303. Baldwin, supra note 301, at 464.
304. Madison's draft of a veto message for the Bank stressed the bank act's
unfair subscription procedure and its enrichment of the Northern speculator
class, as did numerous of his subsequent writings. See James Madison, Draft
Veto of the Bank Bill (Feb. 21, 1791), in 13 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 211, at
395; see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (July 10, 1791), in
14 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 211, at 43; James Madison, Notes on William
Loughton Smith's Politicks and Views (Nov. 4, 1792), in 4 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 211, at 399-400; James Madison, Political Observations (Apr.20,
1795), in 15 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 211, at 511-12.
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government, and its power to branch). However, Madison
was enough of an advocate (or politician) to resort to some
genteel corporophobic rhetoric. He was aware that Old
World banks had suborned governments and was not shy
to share this knowledge in the debate.?° He particularly
focussed on banks' evil twin: the general trading company.
He could not see how a bank charter would not imply
general Federal chartering powers, which would imply a
Congressional power to "give monopolies in every branch of
domestic industry.""°6  He darkly pointed out that
corporations "are a powerful machine, which have always
been found competent to effect objects on principles in a
great measure independent of the People."0 7 He also
casually mentioned the Bank of England, the East India
Company, and the South Sea Company, but left it to the
auditor to make the necessary inferences. 8 ' (The
interminable trial of Warren Hastings was still in
progress.) But this limited corporophobia is perfectly
consistent with Madison's position in the Constitutional
Convention. Trading companies were not consistent with
the public good, but chartered banks could be.
Madison's arguments were typical. Only rarely did raw
anti-corporate sentiment flash through in the debate. 0 9
Corporophobia was generally subordinated to constitutional
arguments. And fear of state banks was almost impossible
to find.
Not all of the anti-BUS agitation was confined to
Congress, or to the foes of banking. Although the BNA itself
305. Madison got his information about Old World Banks, specifically the
Bank of St. George, from Adam Anderson's book The Origins of Commerce. See
James Madison, Notes on Banks (Feb. 1, 1791), in 13 MADISON PAPERS, supra
note 211, at 365-66 nn. 3-4. Anderson, however, was no opponent of banks. See
1 ADAM ANDERSON, AN HISTORICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL DEDUCTION OF THE
ORIGINS OF COMMERCE, 235, 475-77 (London 1764); 2 ANDERSON, supra, at 201-
02.
306. HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 42. Edmund Randolph, who also
opined against the bank, shared Madison's assumption that a bank charter
power implied a general chartering power. More surprisingly, Alexander
Hamilton also shared it. Randolph's assumption was openly expressed in his
opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank, see id. at 87, but Hamilton's was
not. It appeared in his first draft, but was suppressed in the opinion given to
President Washington. See infra text accompanying note 315.
307. HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 82 (James Madison), 57 (Rep.
James Jackson of Georgia).
308. Id. at 42 (James Madison).
309. See id. at 57 (William Penn Boudinot).
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did not seem opposed to the BUS, some factions within the
BNA wanted the BNA to do the BUS's job. William
Bingham, late in 1789, proposed to Hamilton that the BNA
become a national bank with responsibility for currency.
After the BUS was chartered, Pelatiah Webster wrote a
pamphlet arguing strongly against the BUS.
Unsurprisingly, he argued that the BUS charter was issued
in derogation of the BNA's. His indiscriminate attack also
included the bond funding of the BUS, its untested
management, and the tendency of the BUS to centralize all
credit in derogation of state sovereignty, and its potential to
control states through allocation of credit. Webster was
even reduced to arguing that the prohibition of foreign
shareholder voting in the BUS charter would enable large
American speculators to monopolize the BUS.
Webster's attack could not be anything but strained;
Hamilton's proposed BUS charter accommodated all
objections usually made by the opponents of banks, except
objections to the bank's very existence.31° (Hamilton even
deflected Webster's attack on the untested management of
the BUS by hiring the BNA's president, Thomas Willing, for
the new institution!) Hamilton was an animating spirit of
the Bank of New York and was certainly aware of the BNA
experience. Tench Coxe was his Assistant Secretary, and
Hamilton had corresponded with many of the BNA
principals during the charter wars. Indeed, as a private
attorney, Hamilton had represented some of the outsider
shareholders in the BNA's struggle to retain its charter,
and thus had some personal familiarity with corporate
governance struggles." It is uncertain how much influence
Coxe actually had on Hamilton,312 but many of the
provisions advocated by Coxe for the BNA made their way
into the BUS charter.
310. See Letter from William Bingham to Alexander Hamilton (Nov. 25,
1789), in 5 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 551-54; WEBSTER, supra note
91. Pelatiah Webster's objection to deprivation of foreign voting rights wasn't
completely senseless; the foreign shareholders in 1786 were opposed to Robert
Morris's policy of preserving the BNA at all costs. However, Webster
conveniently ignored the regressive voting that Hamilton inserted into the BUS
charter.
311. Rappaport, supra note 5, at 149-50.
312. COOKE, supra note 263, at 172-73.
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3. The Charter. The capital of the new bank was fixed
at $10 million, the lifetime fixed at twenty years, and the
government contribution at 20% of stock. No other federal
charter would be granted to any other bank during the
lifetime of the corporation. The Secretary of the Treasury
was entitled to weekly Bank statements. Loans to the
United States had to be authorized by positive law, and if
such a loan exceeding $100,000 were made without an Act
of Congress, the individuals responsible would have to
forfeit treble the sum of the loan. (A similar clause held
states to $50,000; Webster found this particularly
objectionable.) Notes of the Bank were made legal tender,
and a usury limit of 6% was imposed.
Of all the limitations on bank powers, governance was
the most on Hamilton's mind, and occupied the greatest
amount of space in his brilliant Report on a National Bank.(Hamilton's truly innovative work-his extensive creditor
protections-required far less justification in the report.)
The charter also contained an elaborate regressive voting
scheme, similar to that in the Bank of New York compact(also written by Hamilton), as well as the Maryland and
Providence Bank charters. These shareholders could
include individuals, partnerships or "bodies politic"--i.e.,
states and business, municipal, and religious corporations.
(Most-if not all-of the eighteenth-century charters
contained no restrictions on corporate share ownership, and
often explicitly permitted it.) Only domestic shareholders
could vote, a prohibition reminiscent of the BNA debates, in
which foreign ownership figured significantly. There was
also a limit on how much stock a single person could own.
One-quarter of directors could not be reelected, ensuring
rotation. Rotation-although previously demanded in the
BNA debate-was an innovation in charter technology.
Although regressive voting was a valuable governance
provision in open mercantile communities, there was no
particular mercantile need for rotation. It is no surprise
that the public BUS had the first charter containing a
rotation clause. The large and mandatory capitalization of
the BUS was also a governance feature, ensuring that the
public functions of the bank would not be sacrificed for the
higher dividends of a smaller bank.313
313. See supra note 135.
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The BUS charter also contained the BNA restrictions
on land acquisition and commerce. As with the BNA
charter, no specific punishment was prescribed for improper
land acquisition, but a treble forfeiture was imposed for
commercial dealings. The First BUS prohibition on
commercial dealings, although structurally similar to that
of the BNA or Bank of England, was not a copy of either,
and forbade the BUS to deal in any goods except those
specified as permissible: "bills of exchange, gold or silver
bullion, or... goods really and truly pledged for money lent
and not redeemed in due time; or of goods which shall be
the produce of its lands."314 Hamilton defended the land
provisions in his Report as a bank safety measure but did
not argue for the restriction on commercial dealings.
Hamilton's failure to argue for the restriction on
commercial dealings is curious. Hamilton tried to justify
most of the charter provisions and, unlike Coxe, was not
uncritical in his admiration of the Bank of England. Either
Hamilton could think of no good argument for restrictions
on commercial dealings, or the arguments that occurred to
him did not seem politic. Hamilton was quite capable of
omitting impolitic arguments; his Report did not discuss the
constitutionality of the Bank at all. It is possible that
Hamilton did not choose to discuss the prohibition on
commercial dealings because he had a trading corporation
in mind. Hamilton's first draft of his opinion on the
constitutionality of the Bank contained a detailed argument
that the Constitution permitted trading corporations and, a
fortiori, permitted a Bank.315 This argument was dropped
from the final opinion, with scarcely a trace. As discussed
above, a trading corporation was little more than a
mercantile bank permitted to compete directly with
merchants. The standard contemporaneous defense for the
prohibition on commercial dealings was thus an attack on
trading corporations. If the merchants' utility model is
correct, almost any rationale that Hamilton adduced for
314. 1 BANKIG & CURRENCY, supra note 63, at 313 (First BUS § 9).
315. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to
Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 74-
75, 84. This was not Hamilton's only significant deletion. His draft for the
Report contained penal provisions for embezzlement and counterfeiting; these
were stricken by hand. See 7 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 297. Did
Robert Morris or Tench Coxe remind Hamilton of the circumstances of the 1787
BNA rechartering?
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limited commercial dealings could be later turned against
his plans for a trading corporation.
If this explanation for Hamilton's silence is correct, it is
further evidence that the prohibition on commercial
dealings was not seen at the time as a plausible bank safety
measure, or else Hamilton would have rationalized it on the
basis of safety, as he did with land dealing. Hamilton
probably instituted the prohibition on commerce to lull the
merchants and as a sop to the corporophobes. He certainly
did not seem to believe in it. Hamilton did not seem to care
a fig for the protection of merchants or other established
means of production. Not only did he retain his dream of a
trading corporation; his Society for Useful Manufactures-
an incorporated textile factory in New Jersey-was bitterly
opposed by incumbent manufacturers.316
Although these powers restrictions on land and
mercantile transactions were already becoming standard,
the First BUS had a genuinely innovative bank powers
restriction in its charter; a prohibition on dealing in United
States securities."' BUS directors construed this provision
to forbid state securities dealings, as well.1 8 Hamilton did
not defend the restriction on securities dealing in his
Report. Nor was the restriction contained in the draft of the
Report, although it was both in the final version of the
Report and in the proposed charter he transmitted to
Congress.
This restriction became quite common in the bank
charters granted in 1791-1793, and its genesis requires
some explanation. Merchants did not become active in the
securities business until the 1780s, when depreciated state
and Continental government securities became actively
traded on the market. This market was highly speculative,
since Continental securities were heavily discounted.
However, the securities developed considerable liquidity,
and even served as a medium of exchange in the specie- and
note-starved country.1 9 The price of securities bottomed
316. Maier, supra note 89, at 67.
317. 1 BANKING & CURRENCY, supra note 63, at 311 ("The said corporation
may sell any part of the public debt whereof its stock shall be composed, but
shall not be at liberty to purchase any public debt whatsoever.. . .") (First BUS
§ 7, cl. 10).
318. DOMETT'r, supra note 52, at 39.
319. EAST, supra note 4, at 269-84; 2 REDLICH, supra note 18, at 304-05;
JAAMES SULLIVAN, THE PATH TO RICHEs: AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN AND USE OF
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around 1786, but soared around 1790, after the new
Constitution was in place.32° The market exploded in size in
1790, with Hamilton's refunding of the debt. The net result
of this trade was a wealth transfer from many erstwhile
securities holders to a narrow class of speculators, from
agricultural South to mercantile North. 2' This wealth
transfer was quite visible, and certainly did not please the
transferors, who notably included the Revolutionary War
veterans paid in securities.3 22
Not only did securities become a politically charged
issue, the activity was also functionally uncharacteristic of
early corporations. Securities speculation did not require
collective economic effort; individuals could readily
speculate without pooling capital. Thus, securities might
not be considered a "bank-like" activity. In 1789, the BNA
considered trade in public securities a "kind of
[s]peculation" in which it did not engage, although it was
careful to state that its charter permitted securities
dealings.323 This may be because the BNA contemplated or
actually had securities holdings. (Within ten years, it had
acquired a stock portfolio, possibly a passive one.) In
contrast, the Massachusetts Bank was an active securities
dealer until its securities powers were limited in 1792.324
Securities dealing was not only functionally
uncharacteristic of corporations, it was the sort of activity
in which a bank could use its ability to manipulate prices to
swamp mercantile competitors. Securities dealing was thus
MONEY 15-16 (I. Thomas & E.T. Andrews, Boston, 1792). Hamilton suggested
that public debt had enough liquidity to serve as a reserve for the First BUS.
Alexander Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 33. He also
noted that the incorporation of public debt into First BUS stock (i.e., assets)
would raise the value of the public debt, and thus help subscribers to the First
BUS. Id. The money-like nature of government securities was ballyhooed even
in the early nineteenth century. SAMUEL BLODGET, JR., THOUGHTS ON THE
INCREASING WEALTH AND NATIONAL ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
23 (Washington, D.C. 1801).
320. EAST, supra note 4, at 272, 274. Beard estimated that Continental
paper was selling between one-sixth and one-tenth face value during its nadir.
CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 34 (1935).
321. WALTER WERNER & STEVEN T. SMITH, WALL STREET 13 (1991); EAST,
supra note 4, at 280-84.
322. See infra text accompanying note 330.
323. Letter from Thomas Willing, BNA President, to Alexander Hamilton
(Oct. 1, 1789), in 5 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 17, at 418.
324. See GRAS, supra note 19, at 61-63.
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on a par with the mercantile activities which bank founders
had so carefully avoided. Securities dealing suffered from
all the problems of "commerce," and the additional one of
being considered innately odious by a large portion of the
population. The odium of securities dealing may have
increased further after the market break of 1791-92, which
depressed the buoyant securities markets of 1790-91
throughout the rest of the decade.32
Because Hamilton certainly had no objection to
profiteering, and probably did not believe in limited charter
powers, it is no wonder he did not try to justify the BUS
provision restricting securities dealings. In all likelihood, no
justification occurred to him. He was bowing to a political
pressure that had not yet peaked. No charter issued before
1791 had any explicit restrictions on securities dealings.
The 1791 charters were all restricted, as were most of the
1792 charters. The Providence Bank restriction was
particularly noteworthy. The 1791 Providence Bank charter
was in form a merchants' compact, ratified by the state. The
state added four paragraphs. The second through fourth
added paragraphs conferred benefits to the Bank that a
merchants' compact alone could not provide (i.e., limited
liability, legal process for collecting on debts due to the
Bank, and an anti-counterfeiting law). The first added
paragraph read:
Be it further Enacted... That the Articles aforesaid [i.e., the
mercantile compact] are and shall be the Constitution of the said
Bank; with this Alteration and Proviso, that no Security given
before the passing of this Act shall be received in the said Bank,
subject to the Operation of the Laws of the said Bank; and that no
Securities given after the granting this Charter [sic], which are not
made payable to the said Bank, excepting those commonly called
Bills of Exchange, shall be considered in the Operation of the Laws
of the said Bank.
6
The eighteenth-century charters passed after 1793
tended not to explicitly restrict securities activities. Once
the price of government securities had been stabilized,
securities dealing ceased to resemble profiteering at the
expense of patriots. Future restrictions on securities
activities would have to be inferred from broader
325. WERNER & SMITH, supra note 321, at 12-19, 35.
326. Stat. R.I. (Oct. 1791).
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restrictions on commercial transactions. Although some
post-1793 charters did not restrict commercial activities,
the anomalous charter of the Providence Bank-which
restricted securities activities without restricting
commercial activities-was never again repeated in United
States banking law.
C. The Massachusetts Bank Recharter
Around the same time as the adoption of the BUS
charter, a small bank war was fought in Massachusetts.
The Massachusetts Bank was unpopular for several
reasons. It may not have been as useful to the local
mercantile community as the BNA, having downsized itself
the first year after incorporation and having gone through
early management difficulties. The downsizing-similar to
a contemporary freezeout-created ill-will among those
ejected. The recession of 1791-92 drew the same kind of
obloquy to the Massachusetts Bank as the 1785-86
recession did to the BNA in Philadelphia.327
This bank war seemed spearheaded (polemically, at
least), by James Sullivan, who himself was Attorney
General of Massachusetts (and later became Governor), a
Jeffersonian capitalist with plans for a state bank to
supplant the Massachusetts Bank.328 The grievances against
the Massachusetts Bank, as articulated by Sullivan,
differed significantly from the bill of particulars against the
BUS. Sullivan was certainly no ideological agrarian, and
was not hostile to the idea of business corporations.
However, his pamphlet (printed after the Massachusetts
Bank charter revision) seemed aimed at popular prejudices.
Chief among Sullivan's grievances was securities
speculation. The First BUS subscription had set off a
nationwide stampede of subscribers.29 The BNA and
Massachusetts Bank stock had paid handsome dividends,
and traded above par, so it is little wonder that BUS stock
was eagerly sought. The supply of par stock at issuance was
less than the demand, and the unfair tactics of
sophisticated investors gave them a considerable advantage
in procuring the coveted stock. Worse yet, the BUS stock
327. HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 59, at 114.
328. SULLIVAN, supra note 319, at 43-54; GRAS, supra note 19, at 61-63.
329. HAMMOND, supra note 7, at 123.
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subscription succeeded in its goal of stabilizing the price of
the Federal debt, and the linkage between the two events
was painfully obvious:
The men who had risqued their lives in the war, or who had parted
with their patrimonies or hard earned estates, to save the public
liberty, stood at a distance, and with astonishment beheld the
singular and unexpected phenomenon [of the BUS subscription].
The securities which they had received for their services and
properties, in the place of gold or silver, and had sold at two shil-
lings and six pense in the twenty shillings, resumed their pristine
value in the hands of their new possessors, and greatly enlarged
their new and unexpected value by the machinery of the [BUS]. 0
So strong was Sullivan's grievance at securities
speculation (or so strong was his perception of popular
feeling) that his proposed bank, although saying nothing
about restricted commercial transactions, restricted
securities dealing. Unlike the earlier BNA opponents,
Sullivan was very aware that the Massachusetts Bank
notes were currency, and blamed the Massachusetts Bank
for manipulating the price level through its discounting
policy."1 This accusation would recur again and again in
United States history. Hamilton's bank had permanently
established the connection between banking and money.
The Massachusetts Bank war involved several stages.
First the Bank was the subject of a special tax promulgated
in September 1791 (which was found to be illegal by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court), and the Bank's
charter was restricted in March 1792.32 The restrictions
were relatively mild, imposing reporting requirements,
regressive voting (shareholders could vote only ten shares of
stock), and a limitation on dealing in merchandise or bank
stock.3 Sullivan's demand for a state bank was satisfied in
part by the chartering of the Union Bank in 1792. This
bank was intended to remedy the perceived problems of the
Massachusetts Bank. For example it was forced to devote a
fifth of its funds to small agricultural loans, secured on
land, which were to run at least for one year. Rotation was
330. SULLIVAN, supra note 319, at 31-32.
331. Id. at 37.
332. 2 DAVIS, supra note 3, at 68-69.
333. Stat. Mass. ch. 158 (1792).
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inserted in the charter, as well as the regressive voting
forced on the Massachusetts Bank.
But the Union Bank charter suffered from one problem.
The Union Bank was a business corporation whose
mercantile stockholders and directors-being out for profit
and mercantile credit-had goals similar to the
stockholders and directors of the Massachusetts Bank. The
Union Bank beautifully vindicated Hamilton's thesis that a
chartered bank would be "under the guidance of individual
interest, not of public policy."334 The Union Bank ignored its
more unpleasant duties, and concentrated on being a
mercantile bank.33  Only certain kinds of charter
restrictions were effective in an era in which enforcement of
charters was clumsy. The negative charter restrictions of
the BUS or BNA were effective, especially when they were
consistent with mercantile desires to establish effective
corporate governance. Far more problematic were positive
directives in aid of a public policy antagonistic to mercantile
goals. These could not become effective until the
development of the administrative state.
III. POSTLUDE
Many of the earliest American business corporations
were banks. Their corporate law accommodated the special
governance needs of these merchants' credit clubs. The
operations of these banks were presumably expressive of
these needs; the charter restrictions of these banks seldom
contradicted these needs. These charter restrictions usually
resembled those self-imposed restrictions in by-laws or
partnership agreements. These restrictions were either
governance protections that the merchants themselves
desired, or at worst were concessions of powers that the
merchants did not really want. Charters gave merchants
trustworthy governance devices that helped cope with the
separation of ownership from control: governance devices
not available from contract alone. Secondary benefits of the
charter included: semi-monopolistic franchises, limited
liability, anti-counterfeiting and embezzlement protection,
simplified legal processes, and legitimacy. Before the BUS,
the states' quid pro quo for these charters, apart from the
334. Alexander Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 29.
335. HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 59, at 115.
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benefits of fostering business, was a possible source of
medium-term credit, with an adjunct currency a secondary
benefit. After the BUS, provision of currency became more
significant, and perhaps central, but the charter provisions
were already in place.
Call it coincidence or consummate political skill: the
charter restrictions that assured effective 18th-century
corporate governance were the same ones demanded by
18th century politics. Both the merchants who ran the
banks and the voters who chartered them demanded
limited bank powers. This implies that the "separation of
banking from commerce" so characteristic of contemporary
United States banking law originated as a response to
eighteenth-century political and corporate governance
needs. This connection is intriguing, and perhaps worth
tracing.
After the 1780s and early 1790s, most of the charter
provisions separating banking and commerce became an
apolitical matter of course, throughout at least two thirds of
the nineteenth century. It is difficult to find mention of
these restrictions after the 1780s. For example, the debates
over the reincorporation of the BUS seemed to traverse
every subject but bank powers limitations. An 1814
Treasury proposal to reincorporate the BUS only referred to
the "general powers, privileges and regulations of the bank,
[which] shall be the same as are usual in similar
institutions."336 The language referring to the limitations on
commercial activities and landholding was the same for
every draft of the Second BUS bills of 1815-1816, in strong
contrast to Hamilton's tentative explorations. Lost was any
sense on why the restrictions were there, and the charter
restrictions (except for the regulation of real estate
activities33 ) became increasingly ossified in time.
However, the banking industry was revolutionized, in
two ways relevant to our purposes. First, the demise of
monopolistic banking removed most of the governance role
of charters. The decline of monopoly started by the end of
the eighteenth century, in the major cities, and became
336. HISTORY OF THE BUS, supra note 2, at 483.
337. The language of the land powers restrictions kept changing with time,
responding to the tensions between business opportunity and bank safety
(leavened with fear of mortmain). It was the restriction on commercial activities
that was invisible, and relatively invariable.
1091
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
quite general with the advent of the free banking
movement. Consistent with the merchants utility model
developed above, the old governance provisions involving
rotation and regressive voting disappeared. This model
would predict that merchants and manufacturers need not
worry about fair allocation of credit and concomitant
governance provisions, once monopoly disappeared and they
had the option of establishing (or dealing with) a
competitor.
Second, the "restraining acts" near-universally adopted
around the War of 1812 prohibited individuals or
partnerships from issuing notes-the essence of the
banking business at the time.38 (They were a response to
the collapse of the banking system at this time.) A charter,
therefore, became a necessity for most banking activities,
not a mere convenience in governance. This transformed
the possibilities for public control of banks. No longer were
charter restrictions a fairly accurate expression of
mercantile wants, with perhaps a few public features added
(and often ignored). Instead, charters could be written
restrictively, because a charter was the only route to the
lucrative banking business. The restraining acts gave the
state the leverage to impose whatever charter restrictions it
chose.
Conglomerate corporations were a possible way to work
around these charter restrictions on banking activities, as
witnessed by the Manhattan Company, a bank-cum-
waterworks.3 But in "general, legislatures were chary of
granting, and the companies hesitated to ask, combinations
of diverse powers." 4' It is difficult to find a
contemporaneous statement of policy supporting single-
purpose corporations, but multipurpose corporations had a
338. Bonsal v. Ohio, 11 Ohio 72 (1842); DAVIS R. DEWEY, STATE BANKING
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 143-51 (1910); J. VAN FENSTERMAKER, TE DEVELOPMENT
OF AMERICAN COMMERCIAL BANKING: 1782-1837, at 32-39 (1965); SUANER, supra
note 77, at 83-94.
339. The banking and engineering functions were kept quite separate
within the corporation. Gregory S. Hunter, The Development of Bankers: Career
Patterns and Corporate Form at the Manhattan Company 1799-1842, 14 Bus. &
ECON. HISTORY 59 (1985). Furthermore, the Manhattan Company's engineering
activities were pursued with barely enough enthusiasm to protect the charter.
People v. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. 351 (N.Y. 1832); HARTOG, supra note 230, at
150.
340. 2 DAVIS, supra note 3, at 319; see also HURST, supra note 94, at 44-45.
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very limited role in the antebellum years.84' Such a policy
may have been a consequence of corporophobia, or may
have reflected the ad hoc nature of early corporations,
chartered one by one to address discrete social problems or
discrete desires of their incorporators. A corporate
governance tale is also plausible, at least to the extent that
early business corporations were producer cooperatives, like
banks. Cooperatives tend to develop governance problems
when they branch into disparate lines of business, losing
essential homogeneity of interest.342 It is certainly true that
341. Before 1810, a few corporations obtained a nonbanking charter as a
ruse, and immediately went into banking on a large scale. The most famous
such corporation was the Manhattan Company. Another such corporation was
the Miami Exporting Company, chartered in 1803 ostensibly to transport farm
produce. Legislatures soon got wise to this trick, and subsequently did not
charter banks unless they intended to do so. HAMIMOND, supra note 7, at 170-71.
In the 1810-1837 period, a "development bank" or "improvement bank"
movement enjoyed a vogue, conjoining banking with some other activity. This
movement used the grant of a highly desirable bank charter to encourage
entrepreneurs to enter some less profitable, but socially useful activity. The
legislators who conceived of development banks could be as naive as the
Massachusetts legislature that imposed unwanted business activities on the
Union Bank. These hybrid organizations frequently eliminated (or
subordinated) their undesired functions as soon as seemed decent. CADMAN,
supra note 228, at 68-69 (New Jersey); see also HARTOG, supra note 230, at 150
(Manhattan Bank). In reaction, New Jersey insisted, as a condition of retaining
the bank charter, that the nonbanking activity (generally a public project like a
road) be conducted by a specified time. CADIMN, supra note 228, at 375.
Maryland, a more intelligent practitioner of the policy, usually required its
banks to take stock in such corporations, rather than participate in the desired
activity directly. Indeed, the only true hybrid bank chartered by Maryland
managed to eliminate its unwanted bridge activity before eventually expiring.
BRYAN, supra note 113, at 44-47, 104. Maryland's policy was also conducted in
Connecticut, with the Quinebaug Bank required in 1832 to subscribe one fifth of
its capital to railroad stock. DEWEY, supra note 338, at 49-50. A variant on this
policy was granting note-issuing powers to nonbanking corporations, especially
railroads. See id. at 49-52 (Morris Canal Company of New Jersey; Michigan,
Ohio, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Carolinas, Tennessee (railroad &
others)).
342. See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996).
Professor Hansmann argues that one of the great advantages of investor-owned
firms is that their members all share the same interest: maximum profit.
However, firms owned by customers tend to have multiple interests: both
maximum profit and maximum services. This tension can be resolved if the firm
only offers one service (in which case the profit constraint can collapse into
mere operational efficiency), but can become intolerable if different subclasses
of owners demand different services. Successful mutuals tend to have a
relatively homogeneous product line.
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many of the early conglomerate banks had very little
interest in their nonbanking activities.
The restrictions on commercial activities remained in
these new restricted charters, although their rationale
became increasingly anachronistic. As the Supreme Court
held in Union National Bank v. Matthews:
The object of the [National Bank charter] restrictions was
obviously threefold. It was to keep the capital of the banks flowing
in the daily channels of commerce; to deter them from embarking
in hazardous real-estate speculations; and to prevent the
accumulation of large masses of such property in their hands, to be
held, as it were, in mortmain.343
The object of these restrictions may have been obvious
to the Matthews court, and indeed the prohibition on real
estate lending was justifiable. But the reference to "the
daily channels of commerce" was an anachronism. It
appears to be a reference to the real bills doctrine-which
began its long intellectual reign in America around the
1820s.34 This doctrine-an incoherent hybrid of monetary
policy and prudential regulation-insisted that a bank's
assets consist of little but short-term commercial paper.
This virtually demanded the separation of banking and
commerce, because these asset restrictions precluded
almost all commercial activity. But curiously, the charters
of the day did not further articulate the real bills doctrine
(which would have also barred such traditional banking
activities as extending or dealing in medium-term corporate
credit), but relied on the ancient restrictions.
Apart from a smattering of ultra vires cases, the
separation of banking and commerce was not a particularly
significant political issue until the end of the nineteenth
century. With a few interesting exceptions, incorporated
commercial banks accepted deposits, extended credit,
perhaps issued notes or engaged in securities activities, but
left the rest of the economy to others. The charter
restrictions became increasingly irrelevant, because the
restraining acts began to lose their teeth after the Civil
War. They remained legally effective-indeed were
federalized by the National Bank Act. However, note issue
had become economically secondary, and banking activities
343. Union Nat'l Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.S. 621, 626 (1878).
344. MINTS, supra note 16.
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were more defined by the deposit account and- the check.
Only a bank could issue notes, but until the Glass-Steagall
Act, many firms (and even some licensed individuals) could
take a deposit. Near the end of the century, trust
companies-with relatively unlimited powers including
depository powers-were beginning to assert 
a presence. 
Private banks could always do what they pleased, subject to
the restraining acts, which no longer restrained much of
importance.
Bank powers became a live political issue again in the
late nineteenth century.346 The motive force was familiar-
the intersection of concentrated bank capitalism and
concentrated corporate power. By this time, the original
rationales were frozen dead, and a new set of rationales had
to be applied, notably the real bills doctrine and the general
antitrust spirit of the era. Yet another set of rationales are
being applied to the contemporary debate. (Ironically, some
of the more sophisticated rationales for separating banking
and commerce still rely on corporate governance, albeit
different ones than those which preoccupied Robert Morris,
Tench Coxe, and Alexander Hamilton.) But as discussed
above, the corporophobia of 1786 was still alive in 1886, and
for that matter, is still alive today.
The meaning of limited bank powers has changed
considerably in the last 200 years. What has changed far
less is the language of the charters,347 and American
discomfort with the power and implications of the business
corporation.
345. See generally JAMES G. SMITH, TRUST COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES
(1928).
346. At this point, an interested reader has many sources to consult. E.g.,
H.R. REP. No. 62-1593 (1913) (Pujo Committee Report); GEORGE BENSTON, THE
SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING: THE GLASS-STEAGALL
ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED (1990); BRANDEIS, supra note 242; VINCENT
CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA (1970); NADER ETAL. supra note 208;
WmLIAM NELSON PEACH, THE SECURITY AFFILIATES OF NATIONAL BANKS (1941);
MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AIERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); Helen A. Garten, Subtle Hazards,
Financial Risks, and Diversified Banks: An Essay on the Perils of Regulatory
Reform, 49 MD. L. REV. 314 (1990); Halpert, supra note 20; Edwin J. Perkins,
The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J.
483 (1971); Shull, supra note 287.




This Appendix compares the powers restriction in the
New York free banking charter of 1838 with that of the
modern federal banking charter.
New York Free Banking Act of 1838
18. Such association shall have power to carry on the business of
banking, by discounting bills, notes and other evidences of debt; by
receiving deposites; by buying and selling the gold and silver
bullion, foreign coins and bills of exchange, in the manner
specified in their articles of association for the purposes
authorized by this act; by loaning money on real and personal
security; and by exercising such incidental powers as shall be
necessary to carry on such business; to chose one of their number
as president of such association, and to appoint a cashier, and
such other officers and agents as their business may require, and
to remove such president, cashier, officers and agents at pleasure,
and appoint others in their place.
24. It shall be lawful for such association to purchase, hold and
convey real estate for the following purposes:
1. Such as shall be necessary for its immediate
accommodation in the convenient transaction of its business; or
2. Such as shall be mortgaged to it in good faith, by way of
security for loans made by, or moneys due to, such association;
or
3. Such as shall be conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts
previously contracted in the course of its dealings; or
4. Such as it shall purchase at sales under judgments, decrees
or mortgages held by such association.3
48
348. Act of Apr. 18, 1838, An Act to Authorize the Business of Banking,
1838 N.Y. Laws 61st Leg. Sess., §§ 18, 24. The full text of this charter can be
found in 2 BANKING & CURRENCY, supra note 63, at 1183-91.
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Modern Federal Banking Charter
§ 24 Seventh. To exercise by its board of directors or duly
authorized officer or agents, subject to law, all such incidental
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking;
by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of
exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by
buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion; by loaning money
on personal security.... The business of dealing in securities and
stocks by the association shall be limited to ... [over four pages of
single-spaced text pertaining to securities follow].
§ 25a(a) A national bank may not-
(1) deal in lottery tickets ....
§ 29 A national banking association may purchase, hold, and
convey real estate for the following purposes, and for no others:
First. Such as shall be necessary for its accommodation in the
transaction of its business.
Second. Such as shall be mortgaged to it in good faith by way of
security for debts previously contracted.
Third. Such as shall be conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts
previously contracted in the course of its dealings.
Fourth. Such as it shall purchase at sales under judgments,
decrees, or mortgages held by the association, or shall purchase
to secure debts due to it.
But no such association shall hold the possession of any real
estate under mortgage, or the title and possession of any real
estate purchased to secure any debts due to it, for a longer period
than five years ....349
349. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 25a(a), 29 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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